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1Abstract
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the
Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign
children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ
(variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to eﬃciency
gains. The ﬁrst two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assign-
ment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains
all his acceptable schools. We study the preference revelation game where students
can only declare up to a ﬁxed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the
stability and eﬃciency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify
rather stringent necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the priorities to guarantee
stability or eﬃciency of either of the two mechanisms. This stands in sharp contrast
with the Boston mechanism which has been abandoned in many US school districts
but nevertheless yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, C78, D78, I20
Keywords: school choice, matching, Nash equilibrium, stability, eﬃciency, Gale-
Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, top trading cycles, Boston mechanism, acyclic
priority structure
21 Introduction
School choice is referred in the literature on education as giving parents a say in the
choice of the schools their children will attend. A recent paper by Abdulkadiro˘ glu and
S¨ onmez (2003) has lead to an upsurge of enthusiasm in the use of matching theory for
the design and study of school choice mechanisms.1 Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003)
discuss critical ﬂaws of the current procedures of some school districts in the US to assign
children to public schools, pointing out that the widely used Boston mechanism has the
serious shortcoming that it is not in the parents’ best interest to reveal their true pref-
erences. Using a mechanism design approach, they propose and analyze two alternative
student assignment mechanisms that do not have this shortcoming: the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
A common practice in real-life school choice situations consists of asking to submit a
preference list containing only a limited number of schools. For instance, in the school
district of New York City each year more than 90,000 students are assigned to about 500
school programs, and parents are asked to submit a preference list containing at most
12 school programs. Until 2006 parents in Boston could not submit more than 5 schools
in their choice list.2 In Spain and in Hungary students applying to a college cannot
submit a choice list containing more than 8 and 4 academic programs, respectively.3 This
restriction is reason for concern. Imposing a curb on the length of the submitted lists
compels participants to adopt a strategic behavior when choosing which ordered list to
submit. For instance, if a participant fears rejection by his most preferred programs, it can
be advantageous not to apply to these programs and use instead its allowed application
slots for less preferred programs.
The matching literature usually assumes that individuals submit their true preferences
when either the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mecha-
1Recent papers include Abdulkadiro˘ glu (2005), Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth (2005, 2008), Ab-
dulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, Roth, and S¨ onmez (2005), Chen and S¨ onmez (2006), Erdil and Ergin (2008), Ergin
and S¨ onmez (2006), Kesten (2005), and Pathak and S¨ onmez (2008).
2Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth (2005) report that in New York about 25% of the students submit
a preference list containing the maximal number of school programs, which suggests that the constraint
is binding for a signiﬁcant number of students. Interestingly enough, the school district of Boston re-
cently adopted the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism without a constraint on the length of submittable
preference lists for the school year 2007–2008 (see Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, Roth and S¨ onmez (2006)).
3In Spain and Hungary colleges are not strategic, for the priority orders are determined by students’
grades. So college admission in these countries is, strictly speaking, akin to school choice.
3nism is used. However, little is known about the properties of the these two mechanisms
(i.e., the structure of equilibrium proﬁles and equilibrium outcomes) when individuals
do not necessarily submit their true preferences. In this paper we aim at ﬁlling this
gap by exploring the eﬀects of imposing a quota (i.e., a maximal length) on the submit-
table preference lists of students. Thereby we revive an issue that was initially raised by
Romero-Medina (1998), who shows that any stable matching can be sustained at some
Nash equilibrium under the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism.4 In this paper we con-
sider and compare three matching mechanisms that are or have been employed or proposed
in many US school districts: the Boston (BOS), the Student Optimal Stable Matching
(SOSM) and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms.
The model considered in this paper is the school choice problem (Abdulkadiro˘ glu and
S¨ onmez, 2003) where a number of students has to be assigned to a number of schools,
each of which has a limited seat capacity. Students have preferences over schools and
remaining unassigned and schools have exogenously given priority rankings over students.5
We introduce a preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a ﬁxed
number (the quota) of schools to be acceptable. Each possible quota, from 1 up to the
total number of schools, together with a student assignment mechanism induces a strategic
“quota-game.” Since the presence of the quota eliminates the existence of a dominant
strategy when the mechanism at hand is the SOSM or TTC, we focus our analysis on the
Nash equilibria of the quota-games. Regarding SOSM, our approach complements the
work of Roth (1984), Gale and Sotomayor (1985a), and Alcalde (1996) who characterized
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes when the schools are strategic.6 As for TTC, so far
little has been known about its Nash equilibria.
Our preliminary results concern the existence and the structure of the Nash equilibria
under BOS, SOSM, and TTC. For all three mechanisms and for any quota, there are Nash
equilibria in pure strategies. We establish that for the three mechanisms the associated
4Kojima and Pathak (2007) consider the game played by schools when for each student only a small
set of schools is acceptable.
5Priorities are the counterpart of schools’ preferences over students in the college admissions problem
(Gale and Shapley, 1962).
6Roth (1984) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985a) characterized the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes
when schools are strategic agents in a college admissions problem, assuming that students truthfully
reveal their (whole) preferences. In particular, they showed that Nash equilibria yield stable matchings
and that any stable matching can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome. Alcalde (1996) went one
step further assuming that students may not necessarily use their weakly dominant strategy. He showed
that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of individually rational matchings.
4quota-games have a common feature: the equilibria are nested with respect to the quota.
More precisely, given a quota, any Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium under
any less stringent quota. This leads to the following important observation: If a Nash
equilibrium outcome in a quota-game has an undesirable property then this is not simply
due to the presence of a constraint on the size of submittable lists. Regarding BOS and
TTC we obtain a much stronger result: Nash equilibrium outcomes are independent of
the quota. This is a powerful result, since it allows us to reduce the analysis to games of
quota 1.
The core of this paper is devoted to the analysis of equilibrium outcomes, focusing on
stability and eﬃciency. Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003) discuss in detail the impor-
tance and desirability of these two properties in school choice. In this paper, we explore
under which conditions the mechanisms implement stable and eﬃcient matchings in Nash
equilibria. Most of our analysis will concentrate on SOSM and TTC. The results for BOS
either are already known or come as byproducts of the characterizations for SOSM.7
Stability is the central concept in the two-sided matching literature and does not
lose its importance in the closely related model of school choice.8 Loosely speaking,
stability of an assignment obtains when, for any student, all the schools he prefers to
the one he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher
priority. Romero-Medina (1998) claims that any Nash equilibrium outcome under SOSM
is stable. We provide an example that shows that this is not true.9 Furthermore, the
unstable equilibrium outcome we present cannot be Pareto ranked with respect to the
set of stable assignments, thereby leaving us with little hope for hitting on a closed form
characterization of equilibrium outcomes under SOSM. We therefore turn to the problem
of implementing stable matchings under SOSM. This turns out to be possible if, and
only if, schools’ priorities satisfy Ergin’s (2002) acyclicity condition. However, we may
understand this as a negative result, for Ergin’s acyclicity is a condition that is likely not
to be met in real-life school choice problems. As for BOS, it is easy to show that the
correspondence of stable matchings is implemented in Nash equilibria. Finally, and for
the sake of completeness, we also consider the stability of equilibrium outcomes under
7Alcalde (1996), Ergin and S¨ onmez (2006) and Pathak and S¨ onmez (2008) provide an extensive analysis
of the equilibria under BOS.
8In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they produce stable
matchings —see Roth (2002) and the references therein.
9See also Example 3 in Sotomayor (1998), which even applies to a larger class of mechanisms than
SOSM.
5TTC. Like for SOSM, under TTC unstable matchings may obtain in equilibrium. We
show that Kesten’s (2006) acyclicity condition is necessary and suﬃcient to implement
stable matchings under TTC.
In a school choice problem, eﬃciency is deﬁned with respect to the preferences of stu-
dents only. It is known that in this case SOSM may not be eﬃcient —see Ergin (2002).
TTC then becomes the most natural mechanism to obtain eﬃcient matchings provided
students do submit their true preferences. However, notice that since TTC is no longer
strategy-proof when choice is constrained it is not clear whether it performs better than
BOS, which is also eﬃcient with respect to submitted preference lists. The eﬃciency of
TTC turns out to be not robust to the Nash equilibrium operator. In fact, it is easy
to see that an ineﬃcient matching can be sustained by an Nash equilibrium, even if we
restrict to undominated strategies. This negative result motivates then the search for
conditions that ensure eﬃciency. We show that eﬃcient Nash equilibrium outcomes can
be guaranteed if, and only if, schools’ priorities satisfy a new acyclicity condition called
X-acyclicity. This condition roughly states that two schools cannot prioritize diﬀerently
two students that compete for the last available seat in both schools. A similar but slightly
stronger condition, strong X-acyclicity, is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee eﬃcient
Nash equilibrium outcomes under both SOSM and BOS. It may come as a surprise that
we ﬁnd the same necessary and condition for SOSM and BOS. However, since any stable
matching can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome under both SOSM and BOS,
strong X-acyclicity needs to guarantee that there is a unique stable matching (otherwise
the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings implies that not all equilibrium out-
comes are eﬃcient). In fact, nothing more is needed: X-acyclicity is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the set of stable matchings to be a singleton.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the model of
school choice. In Section 3, we describe the three mechanisms. In Section 4, we introduce
the strategic game induced by the imposition of a quota on the revealed preferences. In
Section 5 we provi de existence results and establish the nestedness of equilibrium out-
comes. In Sections 6 and 7 we investigate the implementability of stable and eﬃcient
matchings, respectively. In Section 8, we study Nash equilibria in undominated trunca-
tion strategies for the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles
mechanism. Finally, in Section 9, we discuss the policy implications of our results and
our contribution to the literature on school choice. Almost all proofs are relegated to the
Appendices.
62 School Choice
Following Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003) we deﬁne a school choice problem by a set
of schools and a set of students, each of which has to be assigned a seat at not more than
one of the schools. Each student is assumed to have strict preferences over the schools
and the option of remaining unassigned. Each school is endowed with a strict priority
ordering over the students and a ﬁxed capacity of seats. Formally, a school choice problem
is a 5-tuple (I,S,q,P,f) that consists of
1. a set of students I = {i1,...,in},
2. a set of schools S = {s1,...,sm},
3. a capacity vector q = (qs1,...,qsm),
4. a proﬁle of strict student preferences P = (Pi1,...,Pin), and
5. a strict priority structure of the schools over the students f = (fs1,...,fsm).
We denote by i and s a generic student and a generic school, respectively. An agent
is an element of V := I ∪ S. A generic agent is denoted by v. With a slight abuse of
notation we write v for singletons {v} ⊆ V .
The preference relation Pi of student i is a linear order over S ∪ i, where i denotes
his outside option (e.g., going to a private school). Student i prefers school s to school
s′ if sPis′. School s is acceptable to i if sPii. Henceforth, when describing a particular
preference relation of a student we will only represent acceptable schools. For instance,
Pi = s,s′ means that student i’s most preferred school is s, his second best s′, and any
other school is unacceptable. For the sake of convenience, if all schools are unacceptable
for i then we sometimes write Pi = i instead of Pi = ∅. Let Ri denote the weak preference
relation associated with the preference relation Pi.
The priority ordering fs of school s assigns ranks to students according to their priority
for school s. The rank of student i for school s is fs(i). Then, fs(i) < fs(j) means that
student i has higher priority (or lower rank) for school s than student j. For s ∈ S and
i ∈ I, we denote by Uf
s (i) the set of students that have higher priority than student i for
school s, i.e., Uf
s (i) = {j ∈ I : fs(j) < fs(i)}.
Throughout the paper we ﬁx the set of students I and the set of schools S. Hence, a
school choice problem is given by a triple (P,f,q), and simply by P when no confusion is
possible.
School choice is closely related to the college admissions model (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962). The only but key diﬀerence between the two models is that in school choice
7schools are mere “objects” to be consumed by students, whereas in the college admissions
model (or more generally, in two-sided matching) both sides of the market are agents with
preferences over the other side. In other words, a college admissions problem is given by
1–4 above and 5’. a proﬁle of strict school preferences PS = (Ps1,...,Psm), where Ps
denotes the strict preference relation of school s ∈ S over the students.
Priority orderings in school choice can be reinterpreted as school preferences in the
college admissions model. Therefore, many results or concepts for the college admissions
model have their natural counterpart for school choice.10 In particular, an outcome of a
school choice or college admissions problem is a matching µ : I ∪ S → 2I ∪ S such that
for any i ∈ I and any s ∈ S,
• µ(i) ∈ S ∪ i,
• µ(s) ∈ 2I,
• µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s), and
• |µ(s)| ≤ qs.
For v ∈ V , we call µ(v) agent v’s allotment. For i ∈ I, if µ(i) = s ∈ S then student
i is assigned a seat at school s under µ. If µ(i) = i then student i is unassigned under
µ. For convenience we often write a matching as a collection of sets. For instance,
µ = {{i1,i2,s1},{i3},{i4,s2}} denotes the matching in which students i1 and i2 each are
assigned a seat at school s1, student i3 is unassigned, and student i4 is assigned a seat at
school s2.
A key property of matchings in the two-sided matching literature is stability. In-
formally, a matching is stable if, for any student, all the schools he prefers to the one
he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher priority.
Formally, let P be a school choice problem. A matching µ is stable if
• it is individually rational, i.e., for all i ∈ I, µ(i)Ri i,
• it is non wasteful (Balinski and S¨ onmez, 1999), i.e., for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S,
sPiµ(i) implies |µ(s)| = qs, and
• there is no justiﬁed envy, i.e., for all i,j ∈ I with µ(j) = s ∈ S, sPiµ(i) implies
fs(j) < fs(i).
We denote the set of individually rational matchings by IR(P), the set of non wasteful
matchings by NW(P), and the set of stable matchings by S(P).
10See, for instance, Balinski and S¨ onmez (1999).
8Another desirable property for a matching is Pareto-eﬃciency. In the context of school
choice, to determine whether a matching is Pareto-eﬃcient we only take into account
students’ welfare. A matching µ′ Pareto dominates a matching µ if all students prefer µ′
to µ and there is at least one student that strictly prefers µ′ to µ. Formally, µ′ Pareto
dominates µ if µ′(i)Riµ(i) for all i ∈ I, and µ′(i′)Pi′µ(i′) for some i′ ∈ I. A matching is
Pareto-eﬃcient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching. We denote the set
of Pareto-eﬃcient matchings by PE(P).
A (student assignment) mechanism systematically selects a matching for each school
choice problem. A mechanism is individually rational if it always selects an individually
rational matching. Similarly, one can speak of non wasteful, stable, or Pareto-eﬃcient
mechanisms. Finally, a mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever beneﬁt by
unilaterally misrepresenting his preferences.11
3 Three Competing Mechanisms
In this section we describe the mechanisms that we study in the context of constrained
school choice: the Boston, Student-Optimal Stable, and the Top Trading Cycles mecha-
nisms. The three mechanisms are direct mechanisms, i.e., students only need to report an
ordered list of their acceptable schools. For a proﬁle of revealed preferences the matching
that is selected by a mechanism is computed via an algorithm. Below we give a description
of the three algorithms, thereby introducing some additional notation. Let (I,S,q,P,f)
be a school choice problem.
3.1 The Boston Algorithm
The Boston mechanism was ﬁrst described in the literature by Alcalde (1996) who called
it the “Now-or-never” mechanism. The term “Boston mechanism” was coined by Ab-
dulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003) because the mechanism was used in the Boston school
district until recently. Consider a proﬁle of ordered lists Q submitted by the students.
The Boston algorithm ﬁnds a matching through the following steps.
Step 1: Set q1
s := qs for all s ∈ S. Each student i proposes to the school that is ranked
ﬁrst in Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). Each school s assigns
11In game theoretic terms, a mechanism is strategy-proof if truthful preference revelation is a weakly
dominant strategy.
9up to q1
s seats to its proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining
students are rejected. Let q2
s denote the number of available seats at school s. If q2
s = 0
then school s is removed.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to the next school
in the ordered list Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). School s
assigns up to ql
s seats to its (new) proposers one at a time following the priority order fs.
Remaining students are rejected. Let ql+1
s denote the number of available seats at school
s. If ql+1
s = 0 then school s is removed.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected or all schools have been removed. Any
remaining student remains unassigned. Let β(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism
β is the Boston mechanism, or BOS for short. It is well known that BOS is individually
rational, non wasteful, and Pareto-eﬃcient. It is, however, neither stable nor strategy-
proof.
3.2 The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
The deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962).
Let Q be a proﬁle of ordered lists submitted by the students. The DA algorithm ﬁnds a
matching through the following steps.
Step 1: Each student i proposes to the school that is ranked ﬁrst in Qi (if there is no
such school then i remains unassigned). Each school s tentatively assigns up to qs seats
to its proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining students are
rejected.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to the next school
in the ordered list Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). Each school
s considers the new proposers and the students that have a (tentative) seat at s. School
s tentatively assigns up to qs seats to these students one at a time following the priority
order fs. Remaining students are rejected.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected. Each student is assigned to his ﬁnal
tentative school. Let γ(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism γ is the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism, or SOSM for short. SOSM is a stable mechanism that is Pareto
superior to any other stable matching mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). An additional
important property of SOSM is that it is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981;
Roth, 1982b). However, it is not Pareto-eﬃcient.
103.3 The Top Trading Cycles Algorithm
The Top Trading Cycles mechanism in the context of school choice was introduced by
Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003).12 Let Q be a proﬁle of ordered lists submitted by
the students. The Top Trading Cycles algorithm ﬁnds a matching through the following
steps.
Step 1: Set q1
s := qs for all s ∈ S. Each student i points to the school that is ranked
ﬁrst in Qi (if there is no such school then i points to himself, i.e., he forms a self-cycle).
Each school s points to the student that has the highest priority in fs. There is at least
one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to
himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is
in a cycle and q1
s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q1
s > 1,
then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes q2
s := q1
s − 1.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 points to the next school in
the ordered list Qi that has not been removed at some step r, r < l, or points to himself
if there is no such school. Each school s points to the student with the highest priority
in fs among the students that have not been removed at a step r, r < l. There is at least
one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to
himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is
in a cycle and ql
s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and ql
s > 1,
then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes ql+1
s := ql
s − 1.
The algorithm stops when all students or all schools have been removed. Any remaining
student is assigned to himself. Let τ(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism τ is the
Top Trading Cycles mechanism, or TTC for short. TTC is Pareto-eﬃcient and strategy-
proof (see Roth, 1982a, for a proof in the context of housing markets and Abdulkadiro˘ glu
and S¨ onmez, 2003, for a proof in the context of school choice). The mechanism is also
individually rational and non wasteful. However, it is not stable.
12The Top Trading Cycles mechanism was inspired by Gale’s Top Trading Cycles algorithm which was
used by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) to obtain the unique core allocation for housing markets (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974). A variant of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadiro˘ glu
and S¨ onmez (1999) for a model of house allocation with existing tenants.
113.4 An Illustrative Example
We illustrate the impact of the quota on the length of submittable preference lists through
the following example.
Let I = {i1,i2,i3,i4} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2,s3} be the set of schools,
and q = (1,2,1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority
structure f are given in the table below. So, for instance, Pi1 = s2,s1,s3 and fs1(i1) <
fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) < fs1(i4).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s1 s1 s2 i1 i3 i4
s1 s2 s2 s3 i2 i4 i1
s3 s3 s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
i4 i2 i3
One easily veriﬁes that if there is no quota on the length of submittable preference lists





Note that if in a direct revelation game under γ or τ students could only submit a
list of 2 schools, student i2 would remain unassigned (and the other students unaﬀected),
provided that each student submits the truncated list with his two most preferred schools.
Therefore, if students can only submit short preference lists, then (at least) student i2
ought to strategize (i.e., list school s3) to ensure a seat at some (acceptable) school. In
particular, the proﬁle of truncated preferences does not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Under both mechanisms in the constrained setting, truncating one’s true preferences is in
general not a (weakly) dominant strategy.
4 Constrained Preference Revelation
Fix the priority ordering f and the capacities q. We consider the following school
choice procedure. Students are asked to submit (simultaneously) preference lists Q =
12(Qi1,...,Qin) of “length” at most k (i.e., preference lists with at most k acceptable
schools). Here, k is a positive integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and is called the quota. Subsequently,
a mechanism ϕ is used to obtain the matching ϕ(Q) and for all i ∈ I, student i is assigned
a seat at school ϕ(Q)(i).
Clearly, the above procedure induces a strategic form game, the quota-game Γϕ(P,k) :=
 I,Q(k)I,P . The set of players is the set of students I. The strategy set of each stu-
dent is the set of preference lists with at most k acceptable schools and is denoted by
Q(k). Let Q := Q(m). Outcomes of the game are evaluated through the true preferences
P = (Pi1,...,Pin), where with some abuse of notation P denotes the straightforward ex-
tension of the preference relation over schools (and the option of remaining unassigned) to
matchings. That is, for all i ∈ I and matchings µ and µ′, µPiµ′ if and only if µ(i)Piµ′(i).
For any proﬁle of preferences Q ∈ QI and any i ∈ I, we write Q−i for the proﬁle of
preferences that is obtained from Q after leaving out preferences Qi of student i. A proﬁle
of submitted preference lists Q ∈ Q(k)
I is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γϕ(P,k) (or
k-Nash equilibrium for short) if for all i ∈ I and all Q′
i ∈ Q(k), ϕ(Qi,Q−i)Riϕ(Q′
i,Q−i).
Let Eϕ(P,k) denote the set of k-Nash equilibria. Let Oϕ(P,k) denote the set of k-Nash
equilibrium outcomes, i.e., Oϕ(P,k) := {ϕ(Q) : Q ∈ Eϕ(P,k)}.
Remark 4.1 Setting the same quota for all students is without loss of generality since
in the proofs we never compare the values of the quota for diﬀerent students.
If the quota is smaller than the total number of schools, i.e., k < m, then students
typically cannot submit their true preference lists and hence there is no weakly dominant
strategy for SOSM and TTC. The next result shows that nevertheless there is a class of
undominated strategies.
One piece of advice about which preference list a student should submit follows from
the strategy-proofness of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading
Cycles mechanism in the unconstrained setting: it does not pay oﬀ to submit a list of
schools that does not respect the true order. More precisely, a list that does not respect
the order of a student’s true preferences is weakly dominated by listing the same schools
in the “true order.” Let ϕ be a mechanism. Student i’s strategy Qi ∈ Q(k) in the game
Γϕ(P,k) is weakly k-dominated by another strategy Q′
i ∈ Q(k) if ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i)Riϕ(Qi,Q−i)
for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i.
Lemma 4.2 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student.
Consider two strategies Qi,Q′
i ∈ Q(k) such that (a) Qi and Q′
i contain the same set of
13schools, and (b) for any two schools s and s′ listed in Qi (or Q′
i), sQ′
is′ implies sPis′.
Then, Qi is weakly k-dominated by Q′
i in the games Γγ(P,k) and Γτ(P,k).
Proof Let ϕ := γ,τ. The result follows directly from the strategy-proofness of γ (Dubins
and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982b) and τ (Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez, 2003) by using
Q′
i as student i’s “true preferences:” ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) is ranked higher than ϕ(Qi,Q−i)(i) by
Q′
i, hence ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) is ranked higher than ϕ(Qi,Q−i)(i) by Pi. ￿
The message of Lemma 4.2 is clear: a student cannot lose (and may possibly gain) by
submitting the same set of schools in the true order.
5 Existence and Nestedness of Equilibria
Our main interest in this section is to analyze the extent to which Nash equilibria are
aﬀected by the value of the quota. To avoid vacuously true statements, we ﬁrst establish
the existence of (pure) Nash equilibria in any constrained school choice problem for all
three mechanisms, for any value of the quota.13
Proposition 5.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Eϕ(P,k)  = ∅, for ϕ =
β,γ,τ.
Understanding whether the presence of a quota aﬀects the set of equilibria and equi-
librium outcomes is crucial in our analysis of constrained school choice games. The next
results describe how the equilibria vary when the quota changes. Fortuitously, Proposi-
tion 5.1 is a direct corollary to these results.
For BOS it turns out that the equilibrium outcomes do not depend on the quota.
Proposition 5.2 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oβ(P,k) = Oβ(P,1).
The existence of equilibria under BOS is therefore a straightforward implication of Propo-
sition 5.2 and Oβ(P,m)  = ∅ (implied by Ergin and S¨ onmez, 2006, Theorem 1 or a slight
adaptation of Alcalde, 1996, Theorem 4.6), where m is the number of schools. We do
13An adaptation of the arguments in the proofs of Alcalde (1996, Theorem 4.6) or Ergin and
S¨ onmez (2006, Theorem 1) establishes Theorem 5.1 for the case of β (any k) and γ (with k = 1). Also
notice that when k = m, the result for γ and τ follows from the strategy-proofness of the unconstrained
mechanisms.
14not give a proof of Proposition 5.2 as it is a direct consequence of Theorem 6.1, which
provides a characterization of the equilibrium outcomes under BOS.
As for SOSM, an equilibrium (outcome) for a given value of the quota is also an
equilibrium (outcome) for any higher value of the quota, i.e., equilibria are nested.
Theorem 5.3 For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eγ(P,k) ⊆ Eγ(P,k′).
Notice that when k = 1 there is only one round in the Boston and the DA algorithm, and
this round is the same for both algorithms. So, the existence of equilibria for SOSM for
any value of the quota follows directly from the existence of equilibria for BOS.
Finally, the set of equilibrium outcomes under TTC is invariant with respect to the
quota.
Theorem 5.4 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oτ(P,k) = Oτ(P,1).
Notice that the true strategy proﬁle P is an equilibrium for k = m (because TTC is
strategy-proof). Hence, Theorem 5.4 implies the existence of Nash equilibria for any
value of the quota under TTC.
The fact that under BOS and TTC the set of equilibrium outcomes does not depend
on the value of the quota will simplify to a great extent our analysis. Indeed, for these
two mechanisms it will be enough to consider strategy proﬁles in which students submit
a list containing at most one school. As for SOSM, the implications of Theorem 5.3 are
not as sharp.
6 Implementation of Stable Matchings
We address in the section the question of the stability of equilibrium outcomes. Among
the three mechanisms we consider, only SOSM is designed to produce stable matchings —
provided agents are truthful. However, when agents are constrained it is not clear whether
a particular mechanism, including SOSM, yields stable matching in equilibrium. While
SOSM is the most natural candidate when studying the stability of equilibrium outcomes
we also consider BOS and TTC.
We ﬁrst start with BOS. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that any equilibrium outcome
is stable.
15Proposition 6.1 For any school choice problem P and any quota k, the game Γβ(P,k)
implements S(P) in Nash equilibria, i.e., Oβ(P,k) = S(P).
This result is obtained through a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1 in
Ergin and S¨ onmez (2006). Alcalde (1996, Theorem 4.6) obtained a similar result in the
context of a marriage market (i.e., when both sides of the market are strategic agents) but
without any constraint on the size of the submittable preference lists. A slight adaptation
of his arguments also leads to a proof of Theorem 6.1. Its proof is therefore omitted.
We now turn to the analysis of equilibrium outcomes when the mechanism in use is
SOSM. Since for quota k = 1 BOS and SOSM coincide, the games Γγ(P,1) and Γβ(P,1)
also coincide. Hence, Proposition 6.1 implies that the game Γγ(P,1) implements S(P)
in Nash equilibria, i.e., Oγ(P,1) = S(P). Together with the nestedness of the equilibria
under SOSM (Theorem 5.3) it follows that any stable matching can be obtained as an
equilibrium outcome under SOSM, for any value of the quota.
Proposition 6.2 (Romero-Medina, 1998, Theorem 7) For any school choice problem P
and any quota k, S(P) ⊆ Oγ(P,k).
However, the next example shows that for higher values of the quota, not all Nash
equilibrium outcomes are necessarily stable.14
Example 6.3 An Unstable Nash Equilibrium Outcome in Γγ(P,k)
Let I = {i1,i2,i3} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2,s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1,1,1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. Let k = 2 be the quota and Q ∈ Q(2)I as given below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s3 s3 i3 i3 i1
s3 s1 s2 i1 i1 i2




One easily veriﬁes that at γ(Q) = {{i1,s1},{i2,s2},{i3,s3}} (which is indicated by the
square boxes) student i2 has justiﬁed envy for school s3. So, γ(Q) is not stable. (In fact
the unique stable matching is γ(P) = {{i1,s1},{i2,s3},{i3,s2}}, indicated in boldface.)
14We are not the ﬁrst to provide an example with an unstable equilibrium outcome. Example 3 in
Sotomayor (1998) already made this point for a class of mechanisms that includes SOSM. However, the
generality of her example comes at the cost of using dominated strategies.
16Routine computations show that i2 has no proﬁtable deviations. So, Q ∈ Eγ(P,2). Notice
also that γ(Q) does not Pareto dominate γ(P), nor is it Pareto dominated by γ(P).
Finally, and in view of Proposition 4.2, notice that (1) none of the students’ strategies in
the equilibrium exhibits “dominated reversals” of schools and (2) all students submit a
preference list with the maximum number k of schools. ⋄
Example 6.3 and Theorem 5.3 suggest that unstable equilibrium outcomes are diﬃcult
to avoid in the quota-game under SOSM. Hence, the only degree of freedom that is left
to obtain stable equilibrium outcomes is the schools’ priority structure. The next result
provides a condition on the priority structure under which SOSM implements the corre-
spondence of stable matchings in Nash equilibria. The relevant condition is an acyclicity
condition introduced by Ergin (2002). Loosely speaking, Ergin-acyclicity guarantees that
no student can block a potential improvement for any other two students without aﬀecting
his own assignment.
Deﬁnition 6.4 Ergin-Acyclicity (Ergin, 2002)
Given a priority structure f, an Ergin-cycle is constituted of distinct s,s′ ∈ S and i,j,l ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
Ergin-cycle condition: fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i) and
ec-scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty and) disjoint sets Is,Is′ ⊆ I\{i,j,l}
such that Is ⊆ Uf
s (j), Is′ ⊆ U
f
s′(i), |Is| = qs − 1, and |Is′| = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure is Ergin-acyclic if no Ergin-cycles exist. △
Theorem 6.5 Let k  = 1. Then, f is an Ergin-acyclic priority structure if and only if
for any school choice problem P, the game Γγ(P,k) implements S(P) in Nash equilibria,
i.e., Oγ(P,k) = S(P).
Ergin (2002) showed that Ergin-acyclicity of the priority structure is necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for the Pareto-eﬃciency of SOSM.15 Therefore, Theorem 6.5 shows that Ergin-
acyclicity has a diﬀerent impact depending on whether one considers SOSM per se or in
the context of the induced preference revelation game.
15Ergin (2002) also showed that Ergin-acyclicity is suﬃcient for group strategy-proofness and consis-
tency of SOSM as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. In the setting of a two-sided
matching model where also schools are strategic agents, Kesten (2007) showed that schools cannot ma-
nipulate by under-reporting capacities or by pre-arranged matches under SOSM if and only if the priority
structure is Ergin-acyclic.
17Obviously, TTC was not introduced to produce stable matchings. It is easy to con-
struct an example for which not every equilibrium outcome is stable.
Example 6.6 A School Choice Problem P with S(P) ∩ Oτ(P,1) = ∅
Let I = {i1,i2,i3} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2} be the set of schools, and q = (1,1)
be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given
in the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2
s2 s1 s1 i1 i3
i2 i2
i3 i1
It is easy to check that the unique stable matching is µ = {{i1,s2},{i2,s1},{i3}}. We
show that µ cannot be sustained at any Nash equilibrium of the game Γτ(P,1). Suppose
to the contrary that µ can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium. In other words, there is
a proﬁle Q ∈ Q(1)I such that τ(Q) = µ and Q ∈ Eτ(P,1). Since τ(Q) = µ, Qi1 = s2 and
Qi2 = s1. If Qi3 = s1, then τ(Q)(i3) = s1  = µ(i3). So, Qi3  = s1. But then τ(Q′)Pi3τ(Q)
for Q′ := (Qi1,Qi2,s1). Hence, Q  ∈ Eτ(P,1), a contradiction. ⋄
However, if we are to compare the three mechanisms we need to ﬁnd a suﬃcient and
necessary condition on the priority structure that guarantees stability, in very much the
same way as we have done for SOSM. In the case of TTC the crucial necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the stability of equilibrium outcomes is Kesten-acyclicity (2006).
Deﬁnition 6.7 Kesten-Acyclicity (Kesten, 2006)
Given a priority structure f, a Kesten-cycle is constituted of distinct s,s′ ∈ S and i,j,l ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
Kesten-cycle condition fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i),fs′(j) and
kc-scarcity condition there exists a (possibly empty) set Is ⊆ I\{i,j,l} with Is ⊆ Uf






and |Is| = qs − 1.
A priority structure is Kesten-acyclic if no Kesten-cycles exist. △
Kesten (2006) showed that Kesten-acyclicity of the priority structure is necessary and
suﬃcient for the stability of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism when students report their
true preferences.16 Kesten-acyclicity implies Ergin-acyclicity (Lemma 1, Kesten, 2006).
It is easy to check that the reverse holds if all schools have capacity 1.
16Kesten (2006) also showed that Kesten-acyclicity is necessary and suﬃcient for the Top Trading
18Theorem 6.8 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, f is a Kesten-acyclic priority structure if and only
if for any school choice problem P, the game Γτ(P,k) implements S(P) in Nash equilibria,
i.e., Oτ(P,k) = S(P).
Kesten’s (2006) result and Theorem 6.8 have in common that Kesten-acyclicity is both
necessary and suﬃcient for the stability of the Top Trading Cycle mechanism. Yet, it is
important to note that, contrary to Kesten (2006), in our game students typically cannot
reveal their true preferences.
Theorem 6.8 is easily proved. If f is Kesten-cyclic then for some school choice problem
P, τ(P) is not stable (Kesten, 2006, Theorem 1). Yet P is an m-Nash equilibrium (τ
is strategy-proof), so by Theorem 5.4 for any k there is a k-Nash equilibrium Q with
τ(Q) = τ(P) / ∈ S(P). Conversely, if f is Kesten-acyclic then it is also Ergin-acyclic
(Kesten, 2006, Lemma 1) and γ and τ coincide (Kesten, 2006, Theorem 1), so the stability
of equilibrium outcomes under TTC follows from Theorem 6.5.
Since Kesten-acyclicity implies Ergin-acyclicity we can compare in a straightforward
way the three mechanisms regarding the stability of equilibrium outcomes. If our criterion
is determined by the domain of “problem-free” priority structures, then BOS outperforms
SOSM, and SOSM in turn outperforms TTC.
7 Implementation of Pareto-Eﬃcient Matchings
In this section we address the implementation of Pareto-eﬃcient matchings. The main
candidate in this case is TTC since it was designed to produce Pareto-eﬃcient match-
ings —provided agents are truthful. To obtain a full comparison as in the previous section
we shall also consider the other two mechanisms.
If we do not impose any restriction on the priority structure then equilibrium outcomes
under TTC may not be Pareto-eﬃcient. To see this, consider the following situation
with 2 students and 2 schools, each with 1 seat. Let P(i1) = s1,s2, P(i2) = s2,s1,
fs1(i2) < fs1(i1), and fs2(i1) < fs2(i2). Then, Q = (s2,s1) is a Nash equilibrium, but
τ(Q) = {{i1,s2},{i2,s1}} is not Pareto-eﬃcient.17 The key element in this example is
that student i1 has higher priority at one school and student i2 has higher priority at
Cycles mechanism to be resource monotonic and population monotonic. In addition, he also proved that
the Top Trading Cycles mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism if and only if
the priority structure is Kesten-acyclic.
17Note that neither Qi1 = s2 nor Qi2 = s1 are dominated strategies.
19the other school. If one of the schools, say school s1, had a capacity greater than 1, say
c + 1, then we would still be able to sustain a Pareto-ineﬃcient equilibrium provided we
can ﬁnd a set of students not including i2 that (1) can ﬁll c seats at school s1 and (2)
have a higher priority at school s1 than student i2. The condition we introduce below,
X-acyclicity,18 formalizes this intuition.
Deﬁnition 7.1 X-Cycles and X-Acyclicity
Given a priority structure f, an X-cycle is constituted of distinct s,s′ ∈ S and i,i′ ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
X-cycle condition: fs(i) < fs(i′) and fs′(i′) < fs′(i) and
xc-scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty and) disjoint sets Is ⊆ I\i, Is′ ⊆ I\i′
such that Is ⊆ Uf
s (i), Is′ ⊆ U
f
s′(i′), |Is| = qs − 1, and |Is′| = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure is X-acyclic if no X-cycles exist. △
The next result establishes that X-acyclicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition to
guarantee that all equilibrium outcomes under TTC are Pareto-eﬃcient.
Theorem 7.2 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, f is an X-acyclic priority structure if and only
if for any school choice problem P, all Nash equilibria of the game Γτ(P,k) are Pareto-
eﬃcient, i.e., Oτ(P,k) ⊆ PE(P).
We now consider the question of the eﬃciency of equilibrium outcomes under BOS
and SOSM. First of all, note that under either mechanism any stable matching can be
sustained at some equilibrium (see the discussion after Proposition 6.1). Hence, by the
lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, BOS and SOSM typically induce Pareto-
ineﬃcient equilibrium outcomes. We now provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition
that ensures that all equilibrium outcomes under BOS and SOSM are Pareto-eﬃcient.
Note that although the set of equilibrium outcomes under BOS is a subset of the set of
equilibrium outcomes under SOSM, the condition is the same for both mechanisms. This
does not come as a big surprise since for both mechanisms we have to make sure that the
set of stable matchings is a singleton (otherwise there is a Pareto-ineﬃcient equilibrium
outcome).
The relevant condition is a slight variant of X-acyclicity.
18The X represents the cross in the priority structure that results from connecting the two entries of
i1 and the two entries of i2.
20Deﬁnition 7.3 Weak X-Cycles and Strong X-Acyclicity
Given a priority structure f, a weak X-cycle is constituted of distinct s,s′ ∈ S and i,i′ ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
X-cycle condition: fs(i) < fs(i′) and fs′(i′) < fs′(i) and
wxc-scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty and) disjoint sets Is ⊆ I\i, I′
s ⊆ I\i′
such that Is ⊆ Uf
s (i′), Is′ ⊆ U
f
s′(i), |Is| = qs − 1, and |Is′| = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure is strongly X-acyclic if no weak X-cycles exist. △
Remark 7.4 Note that if ((s,s′),(i,j,l)) constitutes an Ergin-cycle, then ((s,s′),(i,l))
constitutes a weak X-cycle. Hence, strong X-acyclicity implies Ergin-acyclicity.
Clearly, strong X-acyclicity is very restrictive. In fact, it is easy to see that strong
X-acyclicity implies both X-acyclicity and Ergin-acyclicity. Nevertheless it is a necessary
(and suﬃcient) condition to guarantee the Pareto-eﬃciency of all equilibrium outcomes
under SOSM as well as BOS.
Theorem 7.5 Let f be a priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, the following are
equivalent:
(i) f is strongly X-acyclic.
(ii) For any school choice problem P, S(P) is a singleton.
(iii) For any school choice problem P, all Nash equilibria of the game Γγ(P,k) are Pareto-
eﬃcient, i.e., Oγ(P,k) ⊆ PE(P).
(iv) For any school choice problem P, all Nash equilibria of the game Γβ(P,k) are Pareto-
eﬃcient, i.e., Oβ(P,k) ⊆ PE(P).
Since strong X-acyclicity implies X-acyclicity we can also compare the three mecha-
nisms regarding the Pareto-eﬃciency of equilibrium outcomes. If our criterion is deter-
mined by the domain of “problem-free” priority structures, then TTC outperforms both
SOSM and BOS, and SOSM performs equally well as BOS.
Remark 7.6 Below we show that apart from [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity],
[strong X-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity], and [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity], there
are no other logical implications regarding pairs of acyclicity conditions. The Venn dia-
gram in Figure 1 summarizes these facts.19 Each node indicates the existence of a priority











Figure 1: Venn diagram of the acyclicity conditions
We have made use of four diﬀerent acyclicity conditions. Below we indicate the absence
or existence of each of the 12 possible logical implications between pairs of acyclicity
conditions.
• [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity]: Kesten (2006, Lemma 1);
• ¬ [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity]: Example 2 in Kesten (2006) which is given
by fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i1,i2, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 2;
• [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity]: immediate from deﬁnition;
• ¬ [X-acyclicity ⇒ strong X-acyclicity]: Example 2 in Kesten (2006) which is given
by fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i1,i2, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 2;
• [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity]:
if ((s,s′),(i,j,l)) constitutes an Ergin-cycle, then ((s,s′),(i,l)) constitutes a weak
X-cycle;
• ¬ [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ Kesten-acyclicity]:
fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i1,i2, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 3;
• ¬ [X-acyclicity ⇒ Kesten-acyclicity]: follows from [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity]
and ¬ [strong X-acyclicity ⇒ Kesten-acyclicity];
19A proof that [Kesten-acyclicity and X-acyclicity ⇒ strong X-acyclicity] is as follows. Suppose that
the priority structure is Kesten-acyclic, X-acyclic, but not strongly X-acyclic. By Theorem 7.5(ii)⇒(i),
there is a school choice problem P with |S(P)| ≥ 2. By Theorem 6.8, S(P) = Oτ(P,k). By Theorem
7.2, Oτ(P,k) ⊆ PE(P). Hence, S(P) ⊆ PE(P) and |S(P)| ≥ 2, which contradicts the optimality of the
Student-Optimal Stable matching.
22• ¬ [Ergin-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity]:
fs1 = i1,i2 and fs2 = i2,i1, qs1 = qs2 = 1;
• ¬ [Ergin-acyclicity ⇒ strong X-acyclicity]: follows from [strong X-acyclicity ⇒
X-acyclicity] and ¬ [Ergin-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity];
• ¬ [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity]:
fs1 = i1,i2 and fs2 = i2,i1, qs1 = qs2 = 1;
• ¬ [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ strong X-acyclicity]: follows from [strong X-acyclicity ⇒
X-acyclicity] and ¬ [Kesten-acyclicity ⇒ X-acyclicity];
• ¬ [X-acyclicity ⇒ Ergin-acyclicity]:
fs1 = i1,i4,i5,i2,i3 and fs2 = i2,i4,i5,i3,i1, qs1 = qs2 = 2.
Finally, we give an example of a priority structure that satisﬁes the requirements that are
associated with each of the 7 nodes in Figure 1. Note that all examples can be extended to
incorporate additional students or schools by (1) giving additional students lower priority
and (2) introducing multiple copies of the priority ordering of an existing school.
1. fs1 = i1,i2 and fs2 = i2,i1, qs1 = qs2 = 1;
2. fs1 = i1,i2,i3,i4 and fs2 = i3,i1,i4,i2, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 2;
3. any f where schools have identical priority over students;
4. fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i1,i2, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 3;
5. Example 2 in Kesten (2006) which is given by fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i1,i2,
qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 2;
6. fs1 = i1,i2,i3 and fs2 = i3,i2,i1, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 1;
7. fs1 = i1,i4,i5,i2,i3 and fs2 = i2,i4,i5,i3,i1, qs1 = qs2 = 2.
238 Equilibria in Truncations
In this section we focus on “truncation” strategies which are shown to be undominated
in the quota-games induced by both the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top
Trading Cycles mechanism. We ﬁrst strengthen the negative side of Theorems 6.5 and 6.8
by providing and example that admits a strong Nash equilibrium in truncations that
induces an unstable matching. Next, again for both mechanisms, we will show that in
general there is also no relation between the set of unassigned students at equilibrium
and the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. However, for Nash equilibria in
truncations we do obtain a positive result in this respect for the Student-Optimal Stable
mechanism.
A truncation of a preference list Pi is a list P ′
i obtained from Pi by deleting some school
and all less preferred acceptable schools.20 The following lemma says that in the games
Γγ(P,k) and Γτ(P,k) submitting a truncation “as long as possible” is k-undominated.
Formally, student i’s strategy Qi ∈ Q(k) is k-dominated by another strategy Q′
i ∈ Q(k)
if ϕ(Q′





−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. A strategy in Q(k) is k-undominated if it is not k-dominated by any other
strategy in Q(k).
Lemma 8.1 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a stu-
dent. Denote the number of (acceptable) schools in Pi by |Pi|. Then, the strategy P k
i of
submitting the ﬁrst min{k,|Pi|} schools of the true preference list Pi in the true order is
k-undominated in the games Γγ(P,k) and Γτ(P,k).
Although the strategy proﬁle P k := (P k
i )i∈I is a proﬁle of k-undominated strategies, it
is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in the games Γγ(P,k) and Γτ(P,k). In case it is a
Nash equilibrium it may still induce an unstable matching as Example 8.2 shows.
Example 8.2 For both γ and τ: A Strong Nash Equilibrium in (Undominated)
Truncations that yields an Unstable Matching
Let I = {i1,i2,i3,i4} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2,s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1,1,1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. Let k = 2 be the quota and Q ∈ Q(2)I as given below.
20Truncations have been studied by Roth and Vande Vate (1991), Roth and Rothblum (1999), and
Ehlers (2004) and have also appeared in practice (see for instance Mongell and Roth, 1991).
24Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s2 s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
s2 s3 s1 s2 i1 i2 i4
s3 s1 s2 s3 i2 i3 i3
i4 i4 i1
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3 Qi4
s1 s2 s3 s1
s2 s3 s1 s2
One easily veriﬁes that γ(Q) = {{i1,s1},{i2,s2},{i3,s3},{i4}}. Since student i4 has
justiﬁed envy for school s3, γ(Q)  ∈ S(P). It remains to show that Q ∈ Eγ(P,2). Since
students i1, i2, and i3 are assigned a seat at their favorite school, it is suﬃcient to check
that student i4 has no proﬁtable deviation. Notice that the only possibility for student i4
to change the outcome of the mechanism is by listing school s3. So, the only strategies that
we have to check are given by ¯ Q(2) = {Qa,Qb,Qc,Qd,Qe}, where Qa = s3, Qb = s1,s3,
Qc = s2,s3, Qd = s3,s1, and Qe = s3,s2. Routine computations show that none of these
strategies is a proﬁtable deviation. So, Q ∈ Eγ(P,2).21
Furthermore, since students i1, i2, and i3 are assigned a seat at their favorite school at
γ(Q) and Q ∈ Eγ(P,2), it follows that Q is a strong Nash equilibrium (cf. Aumann, 1959)
in Γγ(P,2).
As for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, one easily veriﬁes that also τ(Q) = {{i1,s1},
{i2,s2},{i3,s3},{i4}}. For the same reason as before, it is suﬃcient to check that student
i4 has no proﬁtable deviation. This, however, is immediate since student i4 cannot “break”
the cycle (i1,s1,i3,s3,i2,s2) that forms in the ﬁrst step of the TTC algorithm. Hence, Q
is also a strong Nash equilibrium in Γτ(P,2). ⋄
The results of McVitie and Wilson (1970) and Roth (1984b) for college admissions imply
that for any school choice problem the set of unassigned students is the same for all stable
matchings.22 In other words, for µ,µ′ ∈ S(P), µ(i) = i implies µ′(i) = i. Given the re-
strictiveness of the acyclicity conditions to guarantee stable Nash equilibrium outcomes,
one may wonder whether at least always the set of unassigned students at equilibrium
coincides with the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. In fact, a less ambitious
21Note that it is not necessary to set the quota equal to 2. Strategy proﬁle Q is also a Nash equilibrium
in the unconstrained setting, i.e., when the quota is k = 3. Finally, one can straightforwardly extend
the example for m > 3 and/or n > 4 by making existing schools unacceptable for new students and new
schools unacceptable for existing students.
22A generalization of this result is known in the two-sided matching literature as the “Rural Hospital
Theorem” (Roth, 1986) and says that the degree of occupation and quality of interns at typically less
demanded rural hospitals in the US is not due to the choice of a speciﬁc stable matching.
25idea would be to establish that at equilibrium the number of unassigned students equals
the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. The following two examples show
that in general this is not true. In other words, the number of unassigned students at equi-
librium is not inherited from that of the set of stable matchings. Given Proposition 6.2,
this in particular implies for the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism that the number of
unassigned students can vary from one equilibrium outcome to another.
Example 8.3 For both γ and τ: Less Assigned Students in an Equilibrium than
in Stable Matchings
Let I = {i1,i2,i3} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2,s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1,1,1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. One easily veriﬁes that strategy proﬁle Q given below is
a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P,2) and Γτ(P,2).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s3 s1 s2 i1 i3 i2




Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1,s1},{i3,s3},{i2},{s2}} and γ(P) = {{i1,s1},{i2,s3},{i3,s2}},
there are less assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. ⋄
Example 8.4 For both γ and τ: More Assigned Students in an Equilibrium
than in Stable Matchings
Let I = {i1,i2,i3} be the set of students, S = {s1,s2,s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1,1,1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. One easily veriﬁes that strategy proﬁle Q given below is
a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P,2) and Γτ(P,2).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s2 s2 i1 i3 i2




Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1,s2},{i2,s3},{i3,s1}} and γ(P) = {{i2,s3},{i3,s2},{i1},{s1}},
there are more assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. ⋄
26We do obtain a positive result for γ if we restrict ourselves to equilibria in trunca-
tions. More precisely, the following proposition says that if a proﬁle of truncations is a
Nash equilibrium in the game Γγ(P,k) then the set of assigned students at the equilib-
rium coincides with the set of assigned students at any stable matching. In fact, each
Nash equilibrium in truncations in the game Γγ(P,k) yields a matching that is either
the student-optimal stable matching γ(P) or Pareto dominates γ(P). For a matching µ,
denote M(µ) for the set of assigned students, i.e., M(µ) := {i ∈ I : µ(i)  = i}.
Proposition 8.5 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If P k ∈ Eγ(P,k),
then M(γ(P k)) = M(γ(P)). In fact, γ(P k)Riγ(P) for all i ∈ I.
For τ we cannot obtain a similar result as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 8.6 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If P k ∈ Eτ(P,k),
then possibly |M(τ(P k))| < |M(γ(P))| or |M(τ(P k))| > |M(γ(P))|.
9 Discussion
We studied in this paper the stability and eﬃciency of Nash equilibrium outcomes in a
school choice problem when either BOS, SOSM, or TTC is used. At ﬁrst sight, the most
robust mechanism is BOS, for Nash equilibrium outcomes are always stable. In all other
cases we need to impose a condition on the priority structure to guarantee stability or
eﬃciency.23 The problem is that these conditions are very restrictive, and hence not likely
to be met in practice.24 Also, it is interesting to note that for SOSM, the implementability
of eﬃcient matchings implies the implementability of stable matchings (see Figure 1). This
is not the case for TTC.
Presumably then, constraining students’ choices is a very costly policy. It de facto
forces them to strategize, which in turns may slash the designer or the policy maker’s in-
terest for using either SOSM or TTC. The results we obtained should be contrasted with
experimental real-life data, however. From the experimental side, Calsamiglia, Haeringer,
and Klijn (2008) show that constraining choices, although having a clear impact on the
23Other recent papers on implementation in various settings of two-sided matching include Pais (2008),
Shinotsuka and Takamiya (2003), Sotomayor (2003), and Suh (2003).
24Another negative feature of SOSM and TTC is that there are equilibria that match (unmatch) stu-
dents that are unassigned (assigned) at the stable matchings. In particular, the number of matched stu-
dents may vary within the set of equilibrium outcomes — see the examples in Haeringer and Klijn (2008).
27performance of the mechanisms, does not alter too much the relative hierarchy of SOSM,
TTC, and BOS (in this order) when one is concerned with diverse issues such as stability,
eﬃciency, truthtelling, or even social mobility. In 2003 the New York City Department
of Eduction (NYCDOE) adopted a centralized mechanism based on SOSM (Abdulka-
diro˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005). Although choice in this mechanism is constrained,
Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth (2008) provide evidence that over the years partici-
pants learned how to make sound choices. Also, the school district of Boston removed the
constraint on the length of submittable preference lists for the school year 2007–2008 (see
see Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, Roth and S¨ onmez (2006)). This suggests that a (reasonable)
constraint would be desirable when the authorities change their mechanisms and adopt
either SOSM or TTC, and then after a few years the constraint could be dropped.
From a theoretical perspective, one possible extension of our model is the incorpora-
tion of incomplete information. Ehlers and Mass´ o (2008) study a many-to-one matching
market with incomplete information. They show that at least for stable mechanisms (i.e.,
in particular SOSM) there is a strong link between the ordinal Bayesian Nash equilib-
ria under incomplete information and the Nash equilibria under complete information.25
More precisely, Ehlers and Mass´ o’s results show that a characterization of the equilib-
ria under complete information immediately leads to a characterization of the equilibria
under incomplete information.
A Appendix: Proofs for SOSM
Let Q ∈ QI. We denote DA(Q) for the application of the DA algorithm (with students
proposing) to Q. We will make use of the following two results to prove Theorem 5.3.
Lemma A.1 (Roth, 1982b, Lemma 1; cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Lemma 4.8)
Let Q ∈ QI and i ∈ I. Let Q′
i ∈ Q be a preference list whose ﬁrst choice is γ(Q)(i) if
γ(Q)(i)  = i, and the empty list otherwise. Then, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) = γ(Q)(i).
Lemma A.2 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oγ(P,k) ⊆ IR(P)∩NW(P).
Proof Let Q ∈ Eγ(P,k). It is immediate that γ(Q) ∈ IR(P). Suppose γ(Q)  ∈
NW(P). Then, there are i ∈ I and s ∈ S with sPiγ(Q)(i) and |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. Let ¯ Qi be
25A strategy proﬁle is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium is if it is a a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for every von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation of individuals’ true preferences.
28the empty list. Let ¯ Q := ( ¯ Qi,Q−i). By a result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985b, Theorem
2) extended to the college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 5.34),
for each j ∈ I\i, either γ( ¯ Q)(j) = γ(Q)(j) or γ( ¯ Q)(j)Qjγ(Q)(j). Hence, the set of
schools to which each j ∈ I\i proposes in DA( ¯ Q) is a subset of the schools to which
he proposes in DA(Q). Since moreover ¯ Qi is the empty list, each school receives in
DA( ¯ Q) only a subset of the proposals of DA(Q). For school s this immediately implies
that |γ( ¯ Q)(s)| ≤ |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. So, if we take Q′
i = s then γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) = s. Since
sPiγ(Q)(i), Q′
i is a proﬁtable deviation for i at Q in Γγ(P,k). So, Q  ∈ Eγ(P,k), a
contradiction. Hence, γ(Q) ∈ NW(P). ￿
Proof of Theorem 5.3 It suﬃces to prove the theorem for k′ = k+1. Let Q ∈ Eγ(P,k)
and suppose that Q / ∈ Eγ(P,k+1). Then, there is a student i and a strategy Q′
i ∈ Q(k+1)
with γ(Q′
i,Q−i)Piγ(Qi,Q−i). By Lemma A.2, γ(Q) ∈ IR(P). Hence, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) ∈ S.
Note also that Q′
i must be a list containing exactly k + 1 schools, for otherwise it would
also be a proﬁtable deviation in Γγ(P,k), contradicting Q ∈ Eγ(P,k).
Let s be the last school listed in Q′
i. We claim that γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) = s. Suppose
γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i)  = s. Consider the truncation of Q′
i after γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) and denote this list
by Q′′
i. In other words, Q′′
i is the list obtained from Q′
i by making all schools listed after
γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) unacceptable. By assumption, Q′′




i is a proﬁtable deviation for i at Q in Γγ(P,k),
a contradiction. So, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) = s.
Let   Qi := s. Note   Qi ∈ Q(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(  Qi,Q−i)(i) = s. Hence,   Qi is a
proﬁtable deviation for i at Q in Γγ(P,k), a contradiction. Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P,k + 1). ￿
We need the following three lemmas to prove Theorem 6.5.
Lemma A.3 Let f be an Ergin-cyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there
is a school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γγ(P,k),
i.e., for some Q ∈ Eγ(P,k), γ(Q)  ∈ S(P).
Proof Since f is Ergin-cyclic, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
(a) fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) and fs2(i3) < fs2(i1),
(b) fs1(ij) < fs1(i2) for each j ∈ I1 := {4,...,qs1 + 2}, and
(c) fs2(ij) < fs2(i1) for each j ∈ I2 := {qs1 + 3,...,qs1 + qs2 + 1}.
Consider students’ preferences P deﬁned by Pi1 := s2,s1, Pi2 := s1, Pi3 := s1,s2,
Pij := s1 for j ∈ I1, Pij := s2 for j ∈ I2, and Pij := ∅ for all j ∈ {qs1 + qs2 + 2,...,n}.
29We distinguish among three cases for the priority ordering fs2 of school s2 with respect
to students i1, i2, and i3: (i) fs2(i2) < fs2(i3) < fs2(i1), (ii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i2) < fs2(i1),
and (iii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i1) < fs2(i2). One easily veriﬁes that in each of the cases (i), (ii),
and (iii), the unique stable matching for P is µ∗ = γ(P) with µ∗(i1) = s1, µ∗(i3) = s2,
and µ∗(i2) = i2.
Consider Q ∈ Q(k)I deﬁned by Qi2 := ∅ and Qi := Pi for all i ∈ I\i2. One easily
veriﬁes that in each of the cases (i), (ii), and (iii), γ(Q)(i1) = s2 and γ(Q)(i3) = s1. So,
γ(Q)  = µ∗, and hence γ(Q)  ∈ S(P). Finally, one easily veriﬁes that Q ∈ Eγ(P,k). ￿
A mechanism is non bossy if no student can maintain his allotment and cause a change
in the other students’ allotments by reporting diﬀerent preferences.
Deﬁnition A.4 Non Bossy Mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981)
A mechanism ϕ is non bossy if for all i ∈ I, Qi,Q′
i ∈ Q, and Q−i ∈ QI\i, ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) =
ϕ(Qi,Q−i)(i) implies ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i) = ϕ(Qi,Q−i). △
Lemma A.5 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Then, γ is non bossy.
Proof Follows from Ergin’s (2002) Theorem 1, (iv) ⇒ (iii) and proof of (iii) ⇒ (ii). ￿
Lemma A.6 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any
school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γγ(P,k) are stable, i.e., for
all Q ∈ Eγ(P,k), γ(Q) ∈ S(P).
Proof Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ Eγ(P,k) but γ(Q)  ∈ S(P). So, by Lemma A.2,
there are i,j ∈ I, i  = j and s ∈ S with γ(Q)(j) = s, sPiγ(Q)(i), and fs(i) < fs(j).
Since γ is strategy-proof in the unconstrained setting (i.e., when the quota equals m,
the number of schools), γ(Pi,Q−i)Riγ(Qi,Q−i). Let Q′
i := γ(Pi,Q−i)(i). Clearly, Q′
i ∈
Q(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) = γ(Pi,Q−i)(i). Hence, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)Riγ(Qi,Q−i).
If γ(Q′
i,Q−i)Piγ(Qi,Q−i), then Q  ∈ Eγ(P,k), a contradiction. Hence, γ(Q′
i,Q−i)(i) =
γ(Qi,Q−i)(i).
By Lemma A.5, γ is non bossy. Hence, γ(Pi,Q−i) = γ(Q′
i,Q−i) = γ(Q). In particular,
γ(Pi,Q−i)(j) = γ(Q)(j) = s. Since sPiγ(Q)(i) = γ(Pi,Q−i)(i), student i has justiﬁed
envy at γ(Pi,Q−i), contradicting γ(Pi,Q−i) ∈ S(Pi,Q−i). Hence, γ(Q) ∈ S(P). ￿
Proof of Theorem 6.5 Proposition 6.1 implies that the game Γγ(P,1) = Γβ(P,1)
implements S(P) in Nash equilibria, i.e., S(P) = Oγ(P,1). Theorem 5.3 implies that
S(P) = Oγ(P,1) ⊆ Oγ(P,k). Now Lemmas A.3 and A.6 complete the proof. ￿
30We need the following 2 lemmas for the proof of Theorem 7.5.
Lemma A.7 Let ϕ be a mechanism such that for some 1 ≤ k ≤ m, Oϕ(P,k) ⊆ NW(P)∩
IR(P). Suppose Q ∈ Eϕ(P,k) with ϕ(Q) / ∈ PE(P). Then, there exist p ≥ 2, a set of
students CI = {i1,...,ip} and a set of schools CS = {s1,...,sp} such that for each school
s ∈ CS, |ϕ(Q)(s)| = qs and for each ir ∈ CI, srPirsr+1 = ϕ(Q)(ir), where sp+1 = s1.
Proof Similar to a part of Step 1 of (iv) ⇒ (i) in Ergin (2002, proof of Theorem 1). ￿
Lemma A.8 Let P be a school choice problem. Let µ ∈ S(P). Deﬁne Qi := µ(i) for all
i ∈ I. Then, γ(Q) = µ and Q ∈ Eγ(P,1) ⊆ Eγ(P,k) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
Proof Follows immediately from Theorem 5.3 and Proposition 6.2. ￿
Proof of Theorem 7.5 We show that (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (i) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (i) ⇒ (iv) ⇒ (i).
(i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose P is a school choice problem with |S(P)| ≥ 2. Hence, there is a
stable matching µ diﬀerent from the student-optimal stable matching µI. By optimality
of µI, for each student i ∈ I, µIRiµ, and for at least one student i ∈ I, µIPiµ. So,
µ / ∈ PE(P). By Lemma A.8, there exists a proﬁle Q ∈ QI(1) such that (a) for each
student i ∈ I, Qi = µ(i); (b) γ(Q) = µ; and (c) Q ∈ Eγ(P,1). By Lemmas A.2 and A.7
there exist a set of students CI = {i1,...,ip} and a set of schools CS = {s1,...,sp} such
that for each s ∈ CS, |γ(Q)(s)| = qs, and for each il ∈ CI, slPilsl+1 = γ(Q)(il). Note
that since a student is assigned to at most one school, for any two schools s,s′ ∈ CS,
γ(Q)(s) ∩ γ(Q)(s′) = ∅. For any two subsets I′,I′′ ⊆ I with I′ ∩ I′′ = ∅ and any school s
we will write fs(I′) < fs(I′′) to say that for all students i′ ∈ I′ and i′′ ∈ I′′, fs(i′) < fs(i′′).
Step 1 For each student il ∈ CI, il ∈ γ(Q)(sl+1) and fsl(γ(Q)(sl)) < fsl(il).
By construction, il ∈ γ(Q)(sl+1). Let Q′ = (sl,Q−il). Since Q ∈ Eγ(P,1), γ(Q′)(il) = il.
In particular, fsl(γ(Q′)(sl)) < fsl(il). By (a), γ(Q′)(sl) = γ(Q)(sl), and Step 1 follows.
Step 2 The priority structure f admits a weak X-cycle.
From Step 1 it follows that the priority structure has the following form















31Suppose fs1(i2) < fs1(i1). Since i1 ∈ γ(Q)(s2), setting i = i2, i′ = i1, s = s1, s′ = s2,
Is = γ(Q)(s1)\ip, and Is′ = γ(Q)(s2)\i1 yields a weak X-cycle.
Suppose now fs1(i1) < fs1(i2). If fs1(i3) < fs1(i2), then we obtain again a weak X-
cycle by setting i = i3, i′ = i2, s = s1, s′ = s3, Is = γ(Q)(s1)\ip, and Is′ = γ(Q)(s3)\i2.
So, suppose fs1(i2) < fs1(i3). By repeating this reasoning with students i4,i5,...,ip−1 we
either obtain a weak X-cycle or establish that the priority ordering of school s1 has the
following form:
fs1 :    γ(Q)(s1)   i1    i2    ip−2   ip−1    
To deal with the latter case, recall that by construction, ip ∈ γ(Q)(s1) and ip−1 ∈ γ(Q)(sp).
So, we obtain a weak X-cycle by setting i = ip, i′ = ip−1, s = s1, s′ = sp, Is = γ(Q)(s1)\ip,
and Is′ = γ(Q)(sp)\ip−1.
(ii) ⇒ (i): Without loss of generality, let students i1 = i and i2 = i′ and schools s1 = s
and s2 = s′ be the agents involved in a weak X-cycle. Without loss of generality we may
assume that Is1 = {i3,...,iqs1+1} and Is2 = {iqs1+2,...,iqs1+qs2}. Consider the students’
preferences P given below. (Unacceptable schools are not depicted.)
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3     Piqs1+1 Piqs1+2     Piqs1+qs2 Piqs1+qs2+1     Pin
s1 s2 s1 s1 s1 s2 s2 s2
s2 s1
Note that for j = qs1 +qs2 +1,...,n, student ij ﬁnds all schools unacceptable. One easily
veriﬁes that the distinct matchings
µI =
 
i1 i2 i3     iqs1+1 iqs1+2     iqs1+qs2 iqs1+qs2+1     in





i1 i2 i3     iqs1+1 iqs1+2     iqs1+qs2 iqs1+qs2+1     in
s2 s1 s1     s1 s2     s2 iqs1+qs2+1     in
 
are stable. So, |S(P)| ≥ 2.
(i) ⇒ (iii): Let P be a school choice problem with Q ∈ Eγ(P,k) such that γ(Q) / ∈ PE(P).
Suppose ﬁrst that |S(P)| ≥ 2. Then, by (i) ⇒ (ii), f admits a weak X-cycle. So, suppose
|S(P)| = 1. By Lemma A.8, there exists ¯ Q ∈ Eγ(P,1) with γ( ¯ Q) = γ(P) =: µI. If
µI / ∈ PE(P) then by Theorem 1 of Ergin (2002) f admits an Ergin-cycle, which by
32Remark 7.4 implies that f admits a weak X-cycle. So, suppose µI ∈ PE(P). Since
γ(Q) / ∈ PE(P), γ(Q)  = µI. Since |S(P)| = 1, γ(Q) / ∈ S(P). By Theorem 6.5, f admits
an Ergin-cycle, which by Remark 7.4 implies again that f admits a weak X-cycle.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose that f admits a weak X-cycle. By (ii) ⇒ (i) there exists P with
|S(P)| ≥ 2. So, there exists µ ∈ S(P)\PE(P). By Lemma A.8, there exists Q ∈ Eγ(P,k)
with γ(Q) = µ.
(i) ⇒ (iv): Let P be a school choice problem with Q ∈ Eβ(P,k) such that β(Q) / ∈ PE(P).
By Theorem 6.1, β(Q) ∈ S(P). Hence, by Lemma A.8, there exists ¯ Q ∈ Eγ(P,1) with
γ( ¯ Q) = β(Q). Hence, from (i) ⇒ (iii) it follows that f admits a weak X-cycle.
(iv) ⇒ (i): Suppose that f admits a weak X-cycle. From (iii) ⇒ (i) it follows that
there is a school choice problem P with Q ∈ Eγ(P,1) such that γ(Q) / ∈ PE(P). Since
Γβ(P,1) = Γγ(P,1), the result follows. ￿
B Appendix: Proofs for TTC
We ﬁrst introduce some graph-theoretic notation to provide concise proofs of our results.
Let Q ∈ QI. Suppose the TTC algorithm is applied to Q, which we will denote by
TTC(Q), and suppose it terminates in no less than l steps. We denote by G(Q,l) the
(directed) graph that corresponds to step l. In this graph, the set of vertices V (Q,l) is
the set of agents present in step l. For any v ∈ V (Q,l) there is a (unique) directed edge
in G(Q,l) from v to some v′ ∈ V (Q,l) (possibly v′ = v if v ∈ I) if agent v points to agent
v′, which will also be denoted by e(Q,l,v) = v′.
A path (from v1 to vp) in G(Q,l) is an ordered list of agents (v1,v2,...,vp) such that
vr ∈ V (Q,l) for all r = 1,...,p and each vr points to vr+1 for all r = 1,...,p − 1. A
self-cycle (i) of a student i is a degenerate path, i.e., i points to himself in G(Q,l). An
agent v′ ∈ V (Q,l) is a follower of an agent v ∈ V (Q,l) if there is a path from v to v′
in G(Q,l). The set of followers of v is denoted by F(Q,l,v). An agent v′ ∈ V (Q,l) is a
predecessor of an agent v ∈ V (Q,l) if there is a path from v′ to v in G(Q,l). The set of
predecessors of v is denoted by P(Q,l,v). A cycle in G(Q,l) is a path (v1,v2,...,vp) such
that also vp points to v1. Note that a self-cycle is a special case of a cycle. With a slight
abuse of notation we sometimes refer to a cycle as the corresponding non ordered set of
involved agents. Finally, for v ∈ I ∪ S, let σ(Q,v) denote the step of the TTC algorithm
at which agent v is removed.
33Observation B.1 In the TTC algorithm, once a student points to a school it will keep
on pointing to the school in subsequent steps until he is assigned to a seat at the school
or until the school has no longer available seats. In other words, if i ∈ V (Q,l) ∩ I for
some step l of TTC(Q) and e(Q,l,i) = s ∈ S, then e(Q,r,i) = s for all steps r with
l ≤ r ≤ min{σ(Q,i),σ(Q,s)}. Similarly, once a school points to a student it will keep on
pointing to the student in subsequent steps until the student is assigned to a seat at this
or some other school. In other words, if s ∈ V (Q,l) ∩ S for some step l of TTC(Q) and
e(Q,l,s) = i ∈ I, then e(Q,r,s) = i for all steps r with l ≤ r ≤ σ(Q,i).
We now proceed to establish some preliminary results and slightly technical lemmas
to be able to prove Theorems 5.4 and 7.2. The proof of the next lemma is omitted.
Lemma B.2 For any school choice problem P and any quota k, Oτ(P,k) ⊆ IR(P).
In order to avoid possible confusion we will sometimes use an additional superindex
Q and write qQ,r
s instead of qr
s.
Lemma B.3 Let Q ∈ QI. Let i ∈ I and Q′
i ∈ Q. Deﬁne Q′ := (Q′
i,Q−i). Suppose
τ(Q)(i)  = τ(Q′)(i). Let p := σ(Q,i), p′ := σ(Q′,i), and r := min{p,p′}. Then,
(a) at steps 1,...,r − 1, the same cycles form in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q′);
(b) i ∈ V (Q,r) = V (Q′,r) and for each school s ∈ V (Q,r) ∩ S, qQ,r
s = qQ′,r
s ;
(c) e(Q,r,v) = e(Q′,r,v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q,r)\i;
(d) there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either G(Q,r) or G(Q′,r) (but not both).26
Proof Item (a) follows from the proof of a result in Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (1999,
Lemma 1) or, alternatively, Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003, Lemma). As for Item (b),
from the deﬁnition of r, i ∈ V (Q,r)∩V (Q′,r). The remainder of Item (b) follows directly
from Item (a). Item (c) follows from Item (b) and the fact that Q′
j = Qj for all j ∈ I\i.
As for Item (d), by deﬁnition of r, there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in G(Q,r) or G(Q′,r).
From Item (c) and τ(Q)(i)  = τ(Q′)(i), e(Q,r,i)  = e(Q′,r,i). In particular, C is not a
cycle in both G(Q,r) and G(Q′,r). This proves Item (d). ￿
Lemma B.4 Let ϕ be a mechanism such that for any Q ∈ QI, any i ∈ I, Q′
i = ϕ(Q)(i) ∈
Q(1) implies ϕ(Q′
i,Q−i) = ϕ(Q). Then, for any school choice problem P and quotas
k < k′, Eϕ(P,k) ⊆ Eϕ(P,k′).
26Note that it is still possible that there is another cycle ¯ C (i.e., ¯ C  = C) with i ∈ ¯ C present in the
other graph.
34Proof Let Q ∈ Eϕ(P,k). Suppose Q / ∈ Eϕ(P,k′). Then, there is a student i with a
strategy ¯ Qi ∈ Q(k′) such that ϕ( ¯ Qi,Q−i)Piϕ(Q). Let ¯ Q′
i := ϕ( ¯ Qi,Q−i)(i). Clearly, ¯ Q′
i ∈
Q(k). By assumption, ϕ( ¯ Q′
i,Q−i) = ϕ( ¯ Qi,Q−i). So, ϕ( ¯ Q′
i,Q−i)Piϕ(Q), contradicting
Q ∈ Eϕ(P,k). Hence, Q ∈ Eϕ(P,k′). ￿
Proposition B.5 For any Q ∈ QI, any i ∈ I, Q′
i = τ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1) implies τ(Q′
i,Q−i) =
τ(Q). In particular, for any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eτ(P,k) ⊆
Eτ(P,k′).
Proof Let Q ∈ QI. Let i ∈ I and deﬁne Q′
i := τ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1). Deﬁne Q′ := (Q′
i,Q−i).
We have to show that τ(Q′) = τ(Q). By non bossiness of τ,27 it is suﬃcient to show
that τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q)(i). If τ(Q)(i) = i, then from the deﬁnition of the TTC algorithm,
τ(Q′)(i) = i = τ(Q)(i).
So, suppose τ(Q)(i) =: s ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that τ(Q′)(i)  = τ(Q)(i). Then,
since Q′
i = τ(Q)(i) = s, student i remains unassigned under Q′, i.e., τ(Q′)(i) = i. Let
p := σ(Q,i), p′ := σ(Q′,i), and r := min{p,p′}. By Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C
with i ∈ C in either G(Q,r) or G(Q′,r) (but not both).
Suppose cycle C is in G(Q,r) but not in G(Q′,r). Since student i is assigned through
cycle C and τ(Q)(i) = s, e(Q,r,i) = s. Since e(Q′,r,i)  = e(Q,r,i) and Q′
i = τ(Q)(i) = s,
e(Q′,r,i) = i. Hence, at the beginning of step r of TTC(Q′), school s has no avail-
able seats, i.e., qQ′,r
s = 0. By Lemma B.3(b), qQ,r
s = qQ′,r
s = 0. So, e(Q,r,i)  = s, a
contradiction.
So, cycle C is in G(Q′,r) but not in G(Q,r). If e(Q′,r,i) = s, then τ(Q′)(i) = s,
a contradiction with τ(Q′)(i)  = τ(Q)(i). So by Q′
i = τ(Q)(i) = s, e(Q′,r,i) = i, i.e.,
C = (i) is a self-cycle. Since i ∈ V (Q,r) and τ(Q)(i) = s, qQ,r
s > 0. By Lemma B.3(b),
qQ′,r
s = qQ,r
s > 0. So, s ∈ V (Q′,r). But then from Q′
i = s, e(Q′,r,i) = s, a contradiction.
We conclude that τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q)(i). ￿
Lemma B.6 Let ¯ Q ∈ QI. Let v,v′ ∈ I ∪ S, v  = v′. Suppose v′ ∈ P( ¯ Q,l,v) at some
step l of TTC( ¯ Q). Then, σ( ¯ Q,v) ≤ σ( ¯ Q,v′) and [σ( ¯ Q,v) = σ( ¯ Q,v′) only if v and v′ are
removed in the same cycle].
Proof By Observation B.1, each agent in the path from v′ to v will keep on pointing to
its (direct) follower at least until the step in which agent v is removed, i.e., step σ( ¯ Q,v).
27P´ apai’s (2000) main result implies that τ is group strategy-proof. Group strategy-proofness implies
non bossiness.
35Hence, σ( ¯ Q,v) ≤ σ( ¯ Q,v′). Suppose σ( ¯ Q,v) = σ( ¯ Q,v′). Then, all agents in the path from
v′ to v form part of a cycle at this step. Since an agent can be part of at most one cycle
at a given step, all agents in the path from v′ to v are in the same cycle. ￿
Lemma B.7 Let Q ∈ QI. Let i ∈ I and Q′
i ∈ Q. Deﬁne Q′ := (Q′
i,Q−i). Suppose
τ(Q)(i)  = τ(Q′)(i) and σ(Q,i) ≤ σ(Q′,i). Then, for each step l with σ(Q,i) ≤ l ≤
σ(Q′,i), if v ∈ V (Q′,l)\(P(Q′,l,i) ∪ i) then v ∈ V (Q,l) and F(Q,l,v) = F(Q′,l,v).28
Proof Let p := σ(Q,i) and p′ := σ(Q′,i). From Lemma B.3(b),





s for each school s ∈ V (Q,p) ∩ S. (1)
With a slight abuse of notation, for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′, denote Pl = P(Q′,l,i) ∪ i. From
Observation B.1,




′) ⊆ V (Q
′,p
′ − 1) ⊆     ⊆ V (Q
′,p + 1) ⊆ V (Q
′,p). (3)
We are done if we prove the following Claim(l) for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′.
Claim(l): If v ∈ V (Q′,l)\Pl, then v ∈ V (Q,l) and e(Q,l,v) = e(Q′,l,v).
Indeed, Claim(l) immediately implies the following Consequence(l):
Consequence(l): If v ∈ V (Q′,l)\Pl, then v ∈ V (Q,l) and F(Q,l,v) = F(Q′,l,v).
We now prove by induction that Claim(l) is true for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′. By Lemma B.3(b,c),
V (Q,p) = V (Q′,p) and e(Q,p,v) = e(Q′,p,v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q,p)\i. Hence,
Claim(p) is true.
If p′ = p we are done. So, suppose p′  = p. Let l be a step such that p < l ≤ p′.
Assume Claim(g) is true for all g, p ≤ g < l ≤ p′. We prove that Claim(l) is true. Let
v ∈ V (Q′,l)\Pl. From (2) and (3), v ∈ V (Q′,g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From
Consequence(g) (p ≤ g < l), v ∈ V (Q,g) and
F(Q,g,v) = F(Q
′,g,v) for each step g, p ≤ g < l. (4)
Since v ∈ V (Q′,l), v is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q′). Then by (1)
and (4), v is also not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q). Hence, v ∈ V (Q,l).
28It follows immediately from the proof that the directed paths associated with F(Q,l,v) and F(Q′,l,v)
in V (Q,l) and V (Q′,l), respectively, also coincide.
36Assume Claim(l) is not true, i.e., x := e(Q,l,v)  = e(Q′,l,v) =: x′. Since v  ∈ Pl, x′  ∈
Pl. By (2), x′  ∈ Pl−1. By (3) and x′ ∈ V (Q′,l), x′ ∈ V (Q′,l−1). By Consequence(l −1),
x′ ∈ V (Q,l − 1). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Agent x′ is removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
From (2) and (3), x′ ∈ V (Q′,g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From Consequence(g)




′) for each step g, p ≤ g < l. (5)
By (1), (5), and the fact that x′ is removed at the end of step l −1 in TTC(Q), x′ is also
removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q′). Hence, x′  ∈ V (Q′,l), a contradiction with
e(Q′,l,v) = x′.
Case 2: Agent x′ is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
Then, x′ ∈ V (Q,l). Since e(Q,l,v) = x  = x′, we have xQvx′ (if v is a student) or
fv(x) < fv(x′) (if v is a school). Hence, since e(Q′,l,v) = x′, x  ∈ V (Q′,l). So, agent x
was removed at some step g∗, 1 ≤ g∗ ≤ l−1, in TTC(Q′). In fact, by (1), p ≤ g∗ ≤ l−1.
Note that no agent in Pp′ is removed before the end of step p′ in TTC(Q′). So, x  ∈ Pp′.
By (2), x  ∈ Pg∗. Hence, x ∈ V (Q′,g∗)\Pg∗. By an argument similar to that of Case 1,
x is also removed at the end of step g∗ in TTC(Q). Hence, x  ∈ V (Q,l), a contradiction
with e(Q,l,v) = x. ￿
Lemma B.8 Let Q ∈ QI. Let i ∈ I and Q′
i ∈ Q. Deﬁne Q′ := (Q′
i,Q−i). Suppose there
is a student j ∈ I\i with τ(Q)(j)  = τ(Q′)(j). Then,
(a) σ(Q,i) ≤ σ(Q,j) and [σ(Q,i) = σ(Q,j) only if i and j are assigned in the same
cycle in TTC(Q)], and
(b) σ(Q′,i) ≤ σ(Q′,j) and [σ(Q′,i) = σ(Q′,j) only if i and j are assigned in the same
cycle in TTC(Q′)].
Proof By non bossiness of τ, τ(Q)(i)  = τ(Q′)(i). Let p := σ(Q,i) and p′ := σ(Q′,i).
Assume, without loss of generality, p ≤ p′. Then, by deﬁnition of p and Lemma B.3(d),
there is a cycle C in G(Q,p) with i ∈ C but not present in G(Q′,p).
We ﬁrst prove (a). By Lemma B.3(a,b), for each student h ∈ I\i with σ(Q,h) < p or
σ(Q′,h) < p, τ(Q)(h) = τ(Q′)(h). Let r := σ(Q,j) and r′ := σ(Q′,j). Since τ(Q)(j)  =
τ(Q′)(j), we have r,r′ ≥ p. So, σ(Q,i) = p ≤ r = σ(Q,j). Suppose σ(Q,i) = σ(Q,j).
We have to show that j ∈ C. Suppose j  ∈ C. Then, j ∈ C∗ for some cycle C∗,
C∗  = C, in G(Q,p). Note i  ∈ C∗. By Lemma B.3(b), V (Q,p) = V (Q′,p). Hence, since
37e(Q,p,v) = e(Q′,p,v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q,p)\i, C∗ is also a cycle in G(Q′,p). In
particular, τ(Q)(j) = τ(Q′)(j), a contradiction. This completes the proof of (a).
We now prove (b). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: j ∈ P(Q′,p,i).
Then, (b) follows directly from Lemma B.6 with ¯ Q = Q′, v′ = j, and v = i.
Case 2: j  ∈ P(Q′,p,i).
Assume that (b) is not true. In other words, assume that σ(Q′,i) > σ(Q′,j) or [σ(Q′,i) =
σ(Q′,j) and i and j are assigned in diﬀerent cycles in TTC(Q′)]. Then, σ(Q,i) = p ≤
r′ = σ(Q′,j) ≤ σ(Q′,i).
Note that by deﬁnition of r′, j ∈ V (Q′,r′). Suppose j ∈ (P(Q′,r′,i) ∪ i). Since j  = i,
j ∈ P(Q′,r′,i). By Lemma B.6, σ(Q′,i) ≤ σ(Q′,j) and [σ(Q′,i) = σ(Q′,j) only if i and
j are removed in the same cycle in TTC(Q′)]. This contradicts the assumption that (b)
is not true. So, j / ∈ (P(Q′,r′,i) ∪ i). In other words, j ∈ V (Q′,r′)\(P(Q′,r′,i) ∪ i).
Hence, by Lemma B.7, j ∈ V (Q,r′) and F(Q,r′,j) = F(Q′,r′,j). Since σ(Q′,j) = r′,
student j forms part of a cycle, say C′, in G(Q′,r′). Hence, C′ = F(Q′,r′,j). So, also
C′ = F(Q,r′,j). Hence, student j is assigned to the same school (or himself) in TTC(Q)
and TTC(Q′), contradicting τ(Q)(j)  = τ(Q′)(j). This completes the proof of (b). ￿
Proposition B.9 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Let Q ∈ Eτ(P,k).
Deﬁne ¯ Qi := τ(Q)(i) for all i ∈ I. Then, ¯ Q ∈ Eτ(P,1) and τ( ¯ Q) = τ(Q). In particular,
Oτ(P,k) ⊆ Oτ(P,1).
Proof It is suﬃcient to prove the following claim.
Claim: Let P be a school choice problem. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m, Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), and j ∈ I. Let
  Qj := τ(Q)(j). Then,   Q := (  Qj,Q−j) ∈ Eτ(P,k).
Indeed, if the Claim is true then we can pick students one after another and each time
apply both the Claim and Proposition B.5 to eventually obtain a proﬁle ¯ Q ∈ Eτ(P,k)
with τ( ¯ Q) = τ(Q) and where for all j ∈ I, ¯ Qj = τ(Q)(j). By construction, ¯ Q ∈ Q(1)I.
So, ¯ Q ∈ Eτ(P,1).
To prove the Claim, suppose   Q / ∈ Eτ(P,k). Then, there is a student i with a proﬁtable
deviation at   Q in Γτ(P,k). In fact, by Proposition B.5 there is a strategy Q′
i ∈ Q(1) with
τ(Q
′
i,   Q−i)Piτ(Qi,   Q−i). (6)
We claim i  = j. Suppose i = j. Then,   Q−i =   Q−j = Q−j. So, (6) becomes τ(Q′
j,Q−j)Pj
τ(Qj,Q−j), contradicting Q ∈ Eτ(P,k). So, i  = j.
38Recall   Q = (Qi,   Qj,Q−ij). Deﬁne   Q′ := (Q′
i,   Qj,Q−ij) and Q′ := (Q′
i,Qj,Q−ij). We




i,   Qj,Q−ij)Piτ(Qi,   Qj,Q−ij) = τ(   Q). (7)
From Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), Lemma B.2 (Oτ(P,k) ⊆ IR(P)), and Proposition B.5, τ(   Q) =
τ(Q) ∈ IR(P). By (7), τ(   Q′)(i) =: s ∈ S. Since   Q′
i = Q′
i ∈ Q(1), Q′
i = s.
Suppose τ(Q′)(j) = τ(Q)(j). Recall   Qj = τ(Q)(j). So,   Qj = τ(Q′)(j). Hence, Propo-
sition B.5 implies τ(Q′
i,   Qj,Q−ij) = τ(Q′
i,Qj,Q−ij) and τ(Qi,   Qj,Q−ij) = τ(Qi,Qj,Q−ij).
Then (7) can be rewritten as τ(Q′
i,Qj,Q−ij)Piτ(Qi,Qj,Q−ij). So, Q / ∈ Eτ(P,k), a con-
tradiction. Hence, τ(Q′)(j)  = τ(Q)(j).
Next, we prove that τ(Q′)(i)  = τ(  Q′)(i). Suppose τ(Q′)(i) = τ(   Q′)(i). Since τ(  Q) =
τ(Q), (7) boils down to τ(Q′)Piτ(Q), which implies that Q / ∈ Eτ(P,k), a contradiction.
So, τ(Q′)(i)  = τ(  Q′)(i).
Note that for any student h  = i, Q′
h = Qh. So, by Lemma B.8, σ(Q′,i) ≤ σ(Q′,j).
Note also that for any student h  = j,   Q′
h = Q′
h. So, by Lemma B.8, σ(Q′,j) ≤ σ(Q′,i).
So, σ(Q′,i) = σ(Q′,j). From Lemma B.8 it follows that i and j are in the same cycle
in TTC(Q′). So, i is not in a self-cycle. Hence, i is assigned to a school in TTC(Q′).
Since Q′
i = s, τ(Q′)(i) = s. By deﬁnition, s = τ( ˜ Q′)(i). So, τ(Q′)(i) = τ( ˜ Q′)(i), a
contradiction. Hence,   Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), which completes the proof of the Claim. ￿
Proof of Theorem 5.4 Follows from Propositions B.5 and B.9. ￿
In order to prove Theorem 6.8 we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma B.10 Let f be a Kesten-cyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there
is a school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γτ(P,k),
i.e., for some Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), τ(Q)  ∈ S(P).
Proof By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), there is a school choice problem P such that
τ(P) is unstable. Since τ is strategy-proof, P ∈ Eτ(P,m). Hence, by Theorem 5.4,
τ(P) ∈ Oτ(P,m) = Oτ(P,k). So, there is a proﬁle Q ∈ Q(k)I such that Q ∈ Eτ(P,k)
and τ(Q) = τ(P)  ∈ S(P). ￿
Lemma B.11 Let f be a Kesten-acyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for
any school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γτ(P,k) are stable, i.e.,
for all Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), τ(Q) ∈ S(P). In fact, S(P) = Oτ(P,k).
39Proof By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), τ = γ. Hence, Oτ(P,k) = Oγ(P,k). By
Lemma 1 of Kesten (2006), f is Ergin-acyclic. So, from Theorem 6.5, S(P) = Oγ(P,k) =
Oτ(P,k). ￿
Proof of Theorem 6.8 Follows from Lemmas B.10 and B.11. ￿
Lemma B.12 Let the priority structure f admit an X-cycle. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then,
there is a school choice problem P with a Pareto ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome in the
game Γτ(P,k), i.e., for some Q ∈ Eτ(P,k), τ(Q)  ∈ PE(P).
Proof Since f admits an X-cycle, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
(a) fs1(ij) < fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) for each j ∈ I1 := {3,...,qs1 + 1} and
(b) fs2(ij) < fs2(i2) < fs2(i1) for each j ∈ I2 := {qs1 + 2,...,qs1 + qs2}.
Consider students’ preferences P deﬁned by Pi1 := s2,s1, Pi2 := s1,s2, Pij := s1 for
j ∈ I1, Pij := s2 for j ∈ I2, and Pij := ∅ for all j ∈ {qs1 + qs2 + 1,...,n}.
Consider Q ∈ Q(k)I deﬁned by Qi1 := s1, Qi2 := s2, and Qi := Pi for all i ∈ I\{i1,i2}.
One easily veriﬁes that at τ(Q) all students in {i3,i4,...,iqs1+qs2} are assigned to their
favorite school. Also, τ(Q)(i1) = s1 and τ(Q)(i2) = s2. It is obvious that at τ(Q)
students i1 and i2 would like to swap their seats, i.e., τ(Q)  ∈ PE(P). Nevertheless, there
is no unilateral deviation for either of the two students to obtain the other seat. Hence,
Q ∈ Eτ(P,k). ￿
Proposition B.13 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If for some school choice problem P there exists
Q ∈ Eτ(P,k) such that τ(Q) / ∈ PE(P) then f admits an X-cycle.
Proof Let Q ∈ Eτ(P,k) be such that τ(Q) / ∈ PE(P). In view of Proposition B.9 we may
assume without loss of generality that k = 1 and for each student i ∈ I, Qi = τ(Q)(i).
For any school s ∈ S and any proﬁle   Q ∈ QI, let As(  Q) be the set of students to which
school s points whenever school s is part of a cycle, i.e.,
As(  Q) := {i ∈ I : there is a step l of TTC(  Q) with i = e(  Q,l,s) and s ∈ F(  Q,l,i)}.
Step 1 There exist p ≥ 2, a set of students CI = {i1,...,ip}, and a set of schools
CS = {s1,...,sp} such that
(a) for each student ir ∈ CI, srPirsr+1 = τ(Q)(ir) (where ip+1 = i0),
(b) for each school s ∈ CS, |As(Q)| = |τ(Q)(s)| = qs, and
(c) for any two distinct schools s,s′ ∈ CS, As(Q) ∩ As′(Q) = ∅.
40One easily shows that that Oτ(P,1) ⊆ NW(P) ∩ IR(P). Hence, by Lemma A.7 there
exist a set of students CI = {i1,...,ip} and a set of schools CS = {s1,...,sp} such that
for each ir ∈ CI, srPirsr+1 = τ(Q)(ir). This proves (a). Obviously,
|As(  Q)| = |τ(  Q)(s)| for any   Q ∈ Q
I. (8)
Hence, by Lemma A.7, for each school s ∈ CS, |As(Q)| = |τ(Q)(s)| = qs. Hence, (b)
follows. Since a student is part of exactly 1 cycle, (c) follows. ￿
For any student ir ∈ CI deﬁne Qr := (sr,Q−ir). By Step 1, τ(Q)(ir) = Qir = sr+1
(modulo p). Since Qr
ir = srPirsr+1 and Q ∈ Eτ(P,1), τ(Qr)(ir) = ir.
Step 2 Let r ∈ {1,...,p}. For each s ∈ S\sr+1, |As(Qr)| = |As(Q)|, and |Asr+1(Qr)| =
|Asr+1(Q)| − 1.
In view of (8) and ir ∈ τ(Q)(Sr+1), we are done if we prove that for each s ∈ S\sr+1,
τ(Qr)(s) = τ(Q)(s), and τ(Qr)(sr+1) = τ(Q)(sr+1)\ir.
For each school s  = sr,sr+1, only the qs (see Step 1(b)) students in τ(Q)(s) list school
s in Qr. Note also that only the qsr+1 − 1 (see Step 1(b)) students in τ(Q)(sr+1)\ir list
school sr+1 in Qr. Since Qr ∈ QI(1) and τ(Qr) ∈ NW(Qr), τ(Qr)(s) = τ(Q)(s) for each
school s  = sr. Finally, note that only the qsr + 1 students in τ(Q)(sr) ∪ ir list school sr
in Qr. Since Qr
ir = sr, τ(Qr)(ir) = ir, and τ(Qr) ∈ NW(Qr), τ(Qr)(sr) = τ(Q)(sr). ￿
Step 3 For any r ∈ {1,...,p}, Asr(Qr) = Asr(Q).
We are done if we show the following claim.
Claim: For each integer l, we have
[sr ∈ V (Q,l) if and only if sr ∈ V (Qr,l)],
[ if sr is in a cycle C of G(Q,l) then C is also a cycle of G(Qr,l)], and





Proof of Claim: We distinguish among six cases.
Case 1: l < min{σ(Q,ir),σ(Qr,ir)}. Then, (9) follows from Lemma B.3(a).
Case 2: σ(Q,ir) ≤ l < σ(Qr,ir). Since Qr
ir = sr and τ(Qr)(ir) = ir, sr  ∈ P(Qr,l,ir).
Since σ(Qr,sr) = σ(Qr,ir) − 1, sr ∈ V (Qr,l). By Lemma B.7, sr ∈ V (Q,l) and
F(Q,l,sr) = F(Qr,l,sr) (as directed paths). So, (9) holds.
Case 3: σ(Q,ir) < l = σ(Qr,ir). Since σ(Qr,ir) = σ(Qr,sr) + 1, F(Qr,l − 1,sr) is the
last cycle of sr under TTC(Qr). By Case 2, this is a cycle of sr under TTC(Q). In fact,
41by Cases 1 and 2 and Step 2, this is also the last cycle of sr under TTC(Q). Hence,
sr  ∈ V (Q,l) and sr  ∈ V (Qr,l), and (9) holds trivially.
Case 4: σ(Q,ir) < σ(Qr,ir) < l. From the proof of Case 3, sr  ∈ V (Q,l) and sr  ∈
V (Qr,l). Hence, (9) holds trivially.
Case 5: σ(Qr,ir) = l ≤ σ(Q,ir). Since σ(Qr,ir) = σ(Qr,sr) + 1, F(Qr,l − 1,sr) is the
last cycle of sr under TTC(Qr). By Case 1, this is a cycle of sr under TTC(Q). In fact,
by Case 1 and Step 2, this is also the last cycle of sr under TTC(Q). Hence, sr  ∈ V (Q,l)
and sr  ∈ V (Qr,l), and (9) holds trivially.
Case 6: σ(Qr,ir) ≤ σ(Q,ir) and l > σ(Qr,ir). From the proof of Case 5, sr  ∈ V (Q,l)
and sr  ∈ V (Qr,l). Hence, (9) holds trivially. ￿￿
For each school sh ∈ CS, let jh be the student to which school sh points in the last
cycle in which sh appears under TTC(Q), i.e., jh := argmaxj∈Ash(Q)fsh(j).
Step 4 For any r ∈ {1,...,p}, fsr(jr) < fsr(jr+1).
Suppose fsr(jr) > fsr(jr+1). From Step 3, jr ∈ Asr(Q) = Asr(Qr) and in particular,





r,ir) − 1. (10)
We will now prove the following claim to complete the proof of this step.
Claim: σ(Qr,ir) ≤ σ(Qr,jr+1).
The claim yields a contradiction to (10). Hence, the assumption fsr(jr) > fsr(jr+1) is
false. Note jr  = jr+1. So, fsr(jr) < fsr(jr+1). ￿
Proof of Claim:
Let j∗
r+1 be the student to which school sr+1 points in ir’s cycle under TTC(Q), i.e.,
e(Q,σ(Q,ir),sr+1) = j∗





Assume σ(Qr,ir) ≤ σ(Q,ir). Denote yr = σ(Qr,ir). From Lemma B.3(a), V (Q,yr) =
V (Qr,yr). By deﬁnition of j∗
r+1, j∗
r+1 ∈ V (Q,yr). However, by assumption, σ(Qr,j∗
r+1)
< yr, and hence, j∗
r+1  ∈ V (Qr,yr) = V (Q,yr), a contradiction.
So, σ(Q,ir) < σ(Qr,ir). Also note that y := σ(Q,ir) ≤ σ(Qr,j∗
r+1) (otherwise, by
Lemma B.3(a), j∗
r+1  ∈ V (Q,y), contradicting the deﬁnition of j∗
r+1). By Lemma
42B.3(b,c), j∗
r+1 ∈ P(Qr,y,ir). Hence, σ(Qr,j∗
r+1) ≥ y = σ(Qr,ir). Again a contra-
diction. So, σ(Qr,j∗
r+1) ≥ σ(Qr,ir).]
O2. For all i ∈ Asr+1(Qr) with fsr+1(j∗
r+1) ≤ fsr+1(i), σ(Qr,i) ≥ σ(Qr,j∗
r+1).
Suppose jr+1 ∈ Asr+1(Qr). Note fsr+1(j∗
r+1) ≤ fsr+1(jr+1). From O2 (with i = jr+1) and
O1, σ(Qr,jr+1) ≥ σ(Qr,j∗
r+1) ≥ σ(Qr,ir).
Suppose now jr+1  ∈ Asr+1(Qr). Assume σ(Qr,jr+1) < σ(Qr,ir). Then,
jr+1  = ir. (11)
We consider two cases.
Case 1: σ(Qr,ir) ≤ σ(Q,ir).
Then, σ(Qr,jr+1) < min{σ(Qr,ir),σ(Q,ir)}. From Lemma B.3(a) it follows that σ(Q,jr+1)
= σ(Qr,jr+1). So,
σ(Q,jr+1) < σ(Q,ir). (12)
However, under TTC(Q), ir is in a cycle with sr+1 and jr+1 is in the last cycle of sr+1.
So, σ(Q,jr+1) ≥ σ(Q,ir), a contradiction to (12).
Case 2: σ(Q,ir) < σ(Qr,ir).
If σ(Qr,jr+1) < σ(Q,ir), then σ(Qr,jr+1) < min{σ(Qr,ir),σ(Q,ir)} which yields the
same contradiction as in Case 1. Therefore, σ(Q,ir) ≤ σ(Qr,jr+1).
From Observation B.1 and the assumption that σ(Qr,jr+1) < σ(Qr,ir) it follows that
for each l ≤ σ(Qr,jr+1), jr+1 / ∈ P(Qr,l,ir). From (11) and Lemma B.7 it follows that for
each l with σ(Q,ir) ≤ l ≤ σ(Qr,jr+1), F(Q,l,jr+1) = F(Qr,l,jr+1) (as directed paths).
So, by taking l = σ(Qr,jr+1), we obtain that jr+1’s cycle under TTC(Q) is the same as
under TTC(Qr). In particular, jr+1 ∈ Asr+1(Qr), a contradiction.
Since both cases give a contradiction we conclude that σ(Qr,jr+1) ≥ σ(Qr,ir). ￿
Step 5 There is an X-cycle.
We can assume, without loss of generality, that among the students in {j1,...,jp} student
j1 is (one of) the last one(s) to be assigned to a school under TTC(Q), i.e.,
σ(Q,j1) ≥ σ(Q,jr) for any r ∈ {1,...,p}. (13)
Suppose fs2(j1) < fs2(j2). By deﬁnition of j2, school s2 points to student j2 in the
last, qs2-th, cycle of s2 under TTC(Q), which occurs at step σ(Q,s2). Hence, j1  ∈
43V (Q,σ(Q,s2)). Hence, σ(Q,j1) < σ(Q,s2) = σ(Q,j2), contradicting (13). Since j1  = j2,
fs2(j2) < fs2(j1).
Let s = s1, s′ = s2, i = j1, and i′ = j2. We have just shown that fs′(i′) < fs′(i). By
Step 4, fs(i) < fs(i′). Deﬁne Is := As(Q)\i and Is′ := As′(Q)\i′. By Step 1(b,c), Is and
I′
s are disjoint sets such that |Is| = qs − 1 and |Is′| = qs′ − 1. Moreover, by deﬁnition of
As(Q) and i, Is ⊆ Uf
s (i). Similarly, Is′ ⊆ U
f
s′(i′). Hence, schools s and s′ together with
students i and i′ constitute an X-cycle. ￿￿
Proof of Theorem 7.2 Follows from Lemma B.12 and Proposition B.13. ￿
C Appendix: Proofs of Results in Section 8
Proof of Lemma 8.1 Let ϕ := γ,τ. We will prove that ϕ(P k
i ,Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Q)(i) for
all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i or ϕ(P k
i ,Q′
−i)Piϕ(Qi,Q′
−i) for some Q′
−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. (This obviously
completes the proof as it implies that no strategy k-dominates P k
i .)
Suppose ϕ(P k
i ,Q−i)(i)  = ϕ(Q)(i) for some Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. We have to show that
for some Q′
−i ∈ Q(k)I\i, ϕ(P k
i ,Q′
−i)Piϕ(Qi,Q′
−i). Suppose that for some   Q−i ∈ QI\i,
ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)Piϕ(P k
i ,   Q−i). Since ϕ(P k
i ,   Q−i)(i)Rii, we have   s := ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(i) ∈ S. From
Lemma A.1 (for γ) and Lemma B.5 (for τ), ϕ(  s,   Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(i).




i ,   Q−i)(i)Riϕ(P
′k
i,   Q−i)(i) = ϕ(  s,   Q−i)(i) =   s, (14)
where P ′k
i is the preference relation obtained from P k
i by putting   s in the ﬁrst position.
The ﬁrst relation follows from Lemma 4.2. The second relation follows from the fact that
the assignment by the DA/TTC algorithm does not change if a student makes more schools
acceptable and puts them below the school he is assigned to. Clearly, (14) contradicts
ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)Piϕ(P k
i ,   Q−i). Hence,   s is not listed in P k
i .
Let   S := {s ∈ S\  s : sQi  s}. The fact that   s is not listed in P k
i together with the
deﬁnition of P k
i implies that there is a school s  ∈   S listed in P k
i with sPi  s. Let s∗ be the
Pi-best school among the schools s  ∈   S listed in P k
i with sPi  s.
Suppose ϕ = γ. Since ϕ(Qi,   Q−i) ∈ NW(Qi,   Q−i), |ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(s)| = qs for all s ∈   S.
Clearly, for all s ∈   S, i  ∈ ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(s). Also, for all s,t ∈   S with s  = t, ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(s) ∩





s if j ∈ ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(s) for some s ∈   S,
∅ otherwise.
44By the assumption that ϕ = γ, ϕ(Qi,   Q−i) ∈ S(Qi,   Q−i). Hence, fs(j) < fs(i) for all
s ∈   S and all j ∈ ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(s). From ϕ(Qi,Q′
−i) ∈ S(Qi,Q′
−i) and the deﬁnition of Q′
−i,
ϕ(Qi,Q′
−i)(i) =   s. Similarly, ϕ(P k
i ,Q′
−i)(i) = s∗. By deﬁnition of s∗, ϕ(P k
i ,Q′
−i)(i) =
s∗Pi  s = ϕ(Qi,Q′
−i)(i), which completes the proof for the case ϕ = γ.
Suppose ϕ = τ. For any s ∈   S deﬁne Is as the set of students j that are assigned a
seat through a cycle (in the TTC algorithm) of which school s is part and such that s
points to j. Formally,
Is :=
 
j ∈ I : e
 
(Qi,   Q−i),σ[(Qi,   Q−i),j],s
 
= j ∈ P
 
(Qi,   Q−i),σ[(Qi,   Q−i),j],s
  
.
From Observation B.1 and sQi  s = ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(i) for all s ∈   S it follows that for all s ∈   S,






s if j ∈ Is for some s ∈   S,
∅ otherwise.
Since sQi  s = ϕ(Qi,   Q−i)(i) for all s ∈   S it follows that fs(j) < fs(i) for all s ∈   S and all
j ∈ Is. From the deﬁnition of Q′
−i and the TTC algorithm, ϕ(Qi,Q′
−i)(i) =   s. Similarly,
ϕ(P k
i ,Q′
−i)(i) = s∗, which completes the case ϕ = τ and hence the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8.5 By deﬁnition of the DA algorithm, |M(γ(P k))| ≤ |M(γ(P))|.
We complete the proof by showing that if i ∈ M(γ(P)), then γ(P k)Riγ(P). (Since
γ(P) ∈ IR(P), γ(P k)(i) ∈ S. Hence, i ∈ M(γ(P k)). But then M(γ(P k)) = M(γ(P)).)
Let i ∈ M(γ(P)). Denote s := γ(P)(i) ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that sPiγ(P k)(i).
Let Q′
i := s. By Lemma A.1, γ(Q′
i,P−i)(i) = s. By a result of Gale and Sotomayor








s, contradicting the assumption that P k ∈ E(P,k). So, γ(P k)(i)Ris = γ(P)(i). ￿
Proof of Proposition 8.6 In Example 8.3, γ(P) = {{i1,s1},{i2,s3},{i3,s2}} and
τ(P) = {{i1,s1},{i3,s3},{i2},{s2}}. So, |M(τ(P))| = 2 < 3 = |M(γ(P))|.
In Example 8.4, γ(P) = {{i2,s3},{i3,s2},{i1},{s1}} and τ(P) = {{i1,s2},{i2,s3},
{i3,s1}}. So, |M(τ(P))| = 3 > 2 = |M(γ(P))|. ￿
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